Whose Summit? The SCO meets in Bishkek

Over the years the inclusion of India and Pakistan within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization had been debated and withheld on the ground that they would bring with them a plethora of bilateral issues that would overshadow critical developmental and security issues within the essentially Pan Eurasia organization. The rather optimistic assumption that this would be transformed with their participation in the Tashkent based Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure and projected joint exercises with other SCO members anticipated not just resolution of long standing bilateral disputes but also the political and economic influence and deep seated interest of other states.  It is not just the fact that the responsibility for the Pulwama attack was accepted by the Jaish-e-Mohammad based in Pakistan which makes bilateral relations problematic. Over the years various other contending interests have been inserted into the Indo-Pakistan relationship the most recent being the much publicized Chinese initiative the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. And all of these issues converge in the SCO where Russia, China, India, Pakistan and the five Central Asian states, among others, are now permanent members.

This year much of the SCO Summit news was about the bilateral meetings that Prime Minister Narendra Modi held with the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chinese Premier Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Summit, where among other issues they were expected to touch upon the trade war between China and the US and the impact of US sanctions on Iran. Besides this Prime Minister Modi met Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Sharipovich Jeenbekov during the bilateral component of his visit to Bishkek. However, what made headlines, even before the Summit, was the request that the Indian government put forward to Pakistan to allow the Prime Minister’s flight to travel through Pakistan’s airspace, the last minute confirmation of the request and the final decision of the Prime Minister not to fly through the Pakistan space but to fly via Oman and Iran into Central Asia.This was seen as a diplomatic snub which was followed by visuals of the two leaders ignoring each other on the opening day of the Summit and then only exchanging pleasantries in the leaders lounge the following day. There was extensive coverage of the support that the decision not to overfly Pakistan received from Indian medical students in Bishkek who have been inconvenienced by the closure of the Pakistan airspace and unable to return to India given the prohibitive costs of the other routes. Of course there was no meeting scheduled between the Indian Prime Minister and his Pakistani counterpart who are both part of the Summit.

An advisory by the Chinese government that the SCO was not a forum to target any one country, without actually naming Pakistan was revealing as it was clear that India would raise the issue of terrorism and state sponsored terrorism at the Summit which the Prime Minister did without naming any country. Not surprisingly, the Joint Declaration signed by the member states condemned terrorism in all its forms. The Bishkek Declaration stressed that increasingly challenges and security threats are becoming cross border in nature with extremist ideology spreading through the internet, the return of militants from conflict areas and increasing arms race. The Declaration called on the international community to promote global cooperation in combatting terrorism in accordance with principles of international law and noted that interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries under the pretext of fighting terrorism and extremism and using terrorist, extremist and radical groups to achieve one’s own ends is unacceptable. It underlined the need for the international community to take joint steps to counter attempts to involve young people in terrorist acts and to focus on preventing the rise of religious intolerance and xenophobia. The members stressed that one of the requirements for enhancing security and stability in the SCO region was a resolution of the Afghan situation.

India’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was through a much debated process where the advantages and disadvantages of membership into a multilateral forum that would include not just Russia and China but also Pakistan has been subject to intense scrutiny not just by commentators from within India but also globally. More positive commentaries assumed that the SCO would become a forum where Pakistan could be held accountable for its terrorism, India’s relations with China would be negotiated and peripherally the issue of non-contiguity of India with the Central Asian region would be resolved by opening up lines of communication through Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, there is reason to critically assess the role that the SCO was assigned as a negotiator for bilateral issues. And here one needs to take note not just of the intent of the original founders of Shanghai Five but also how the Organization itself has responded to various situations within the ambit of its core space and its immediate neighbourhood.

A myriad of bilateral military and economic links within the SCO has often prevented it from developing a multilateral response in critical situations. While its lack of reaction to the ‘war on terror’ in its initial years was justified with the argument that Afghanistan was not a part of the organization, this continued in the case of conflicts emerging out of domestic power politics or even critical moments within the region like Andijan (2005) or Osh (2010) that involved member states and led to ethnic clashes and movements of people across borders. Member states have remained deadlocked over appropriate action in case of issues that have been identified as internal to states, security action in case of cross border issues and most importantly expansion through introduction of new members. Greater attention has been paid by both Russia and China to developing bilateral relations with the member Central Asian states and alternative economic forums like the Eurasian Economic Community have emerged within the same space with the SCO failing to provide a collective economic potential.

Diverging internal and foreign economic policies, varying commitments to institutions like the WTO or even the Russia led Customs Union, the absence of a free trade zone and underdeveloped infrastructure has impeded intra SCO economic potential. Issues where there has been general agreement among SCO members include preventing bilateral issues from clouding the overall SCO agenda and non-interference in bilateral or domestic matters. The lack of SCO involvement in Osh in 2010, was not just a reflection on the SCO’s crisis management capabilities but also one of non-interference and has been matched by the lack of involvement during the Uzbek-Tajik feud over regional hydropower resources which led to Uzbekistan’s blockade of rail shipments of equipment that Tajikistan needed to construct the Rogun Dam. Non-interference has extended to ‘color revolutions’ with a broad definition of ‘security threats’ and contending definitions of ‘political change’ and ‘regional autonomy’ encouraging inaction.

‘Security’ and ‘development’ had been identified by the Chinese Premier as crucial to the SCO Summit in Bishkek. However, it is multilateralism and protectionism that seem to have been at the forefront of discussions among the Indian, Russian and Chinese leaders. While important for the Central Asian states who form the core of the organization and whose leaders were in attendance, there is very little information on what these states brought to the table and how issues critical to the region (other than security) would be resolved. A recent transition in Kazakhstan was the first instance of a transfer of power by a leader of more than two decades to his chosen successor who won a much debated election recently where lack of proper housing became a major issue of contention and protest. This and similar transitions cannot be relegated as ‘internal’ matters of the state and overlooked as non- consequential to the broader aims of the organization. It is not enough for the Summits to be physically located in the Central Asian space. For the organization to be effective as a Pan Eurasian forum a broader perspective on critical issues like water, health, connectivity and distribution grids for power need to be on the agenda.

Anita Sengupta

15 June 2019