The Unsolved Question

The Kurdish referendum in Iraq scheduled exactly a month from today on 25 September has been labeled more a declaration of intent than any viable bid for independence. Arguments range from its lack of legitimacy in a situation where the Kurdish Parliament never passed the proposed constitution establishing the legality of the referendum to its precarious acceptance by future governments as well as the lack of a viable blueprint for further negotiation and institutionalization. Kurdistan Regional Government  (KRG) head Massoud Barzani has also faced stiff opposition to the vote not just from western powers on the ground that it will endanger the territorial integrity of Iraq but also from Turkey as it fears the outcome of an independent Kurdish territory along a border that is inhabited by Turkey’s own Kurdish population.

The referendum therefore raises questions on the classic binary between people and borders which is further complicated by the presence of natural resources. It also leaves unanswered the question of what are the markers of the transition from ‘autonomy’ to ‘independence’. This question becomes particularly relevant when one takes note of the fact that in addition to a territory that it defines for itself, Iraqi Kurdistan has its own parliament and its own forces the Peshmerga who have been reasonably successful against the ISIS. Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region was established under US protection, following, the 1990-91 Gulf War against Saddam Hussein. Living mostly along Iraq’s northern borders with Turkey, Syria and Iran, Iraqi Kurds speak their own distinct languages and are predominantly Sunni in a largely Shia state. Interestingly enough all of these are acknowledged as ‘symbols’ of sovereignty.

The Turkish predicament is complex. While initially opposed to the idea of an autonomous area on its borders, events beyond its control forced Ankara not only to cooperate with the KRG, but also to turn the situation to its advantage by making the autonomous Kurdish region a major partner in the economic and energy fields. The volume of trade between Turkey and northern Iraq currently stands at around $8.5 billion, and since the Iraqi Kurdish region includes Kirkuk there are billions of dollars’ worth of proposed energy projects in the pipeline. These economic connections extend to the political and Barzani and President Erdogan share close personal and diplomatic ties with Barzani having called on Turkish Kurds to support Erdgan in the past during the Presidential and general elections.

While Turkey accepted northern Iraq’s autonomous status over time, the dilemma is about the future of the Syrian Kurdish areas, adjoining south eastern Turkey, and the precedence that the autonomous status of the Kurds would create for the Kurdish population in Syria and Turkey. Turkey has battled domestic Kurdish insurgency for decades and has only recently begun negotiations for conciliation. It therefore fears the domestic consequences of the creation of a contiguous area under Kurdish control in northern Syria. When the Syrian crisis started in March 2011, Syria’s Kurds adopted an ambivalent position. However, in July 2012 they took control of several cities in the north where Kurds are in a majority. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) which governs this region, bordering Turkey, is affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and has clearly expressed an interest to form an autonomous zone in Syria comparable to Iraqi Kurdistan, a move Ankara opposes. Turkey’s Syrian policy, in which President Erdogan had sought President Bashar’s overthrow, therefore became counterproductive when it contributed to bringing Syrian Kurds into the fray.

In a sense of course it was Turkey’s anti-Assad policies and support for anti-Assad groups that generated the pro-Kurdish outcome. This was compounded by the results of the June 2015 election in Turkey where the pro-Kurdish HDP (Democratic People’s Party) crossed the 10 percent threshold for the first time. President Erdogan was aware that the 13 percent votes that the HDP received was a principle reason why the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) failed to get a majority. Anti- Kurdish policies were renewed both domestically and in the neighbourhood and predictably there were attacks on Turkish soldiers and police officers in the Kurdish dominant south-east and clashes between Kurdish militants and Turkish forces that left casualties on both sides. The result was a campaign of violence that culminated in the bombings of a procession in Ankara on 10 October (subsequently blamed on the Islamic State) which was calling for resumption of peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish state and the subsequent dismissal of more than a thousand academics who had called for resumption of talks.

Domestically, attacks on the HDP and PKK have been vindicated in terms of ‘nation under threat’ and to encourage voters into supporting President Erdogan’s ‘security first’ agenda. The justification for change has been couched in terms of an effective executive state more capable of facing terrorism, civil war, economic decline and corruption. Former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed on what he referred to as a “terror cocktail” of the PKK, the Islamic State and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party Front, all of who wanted chaos in Turkey, thereby appealing to nationalist elements. The AKP election campaign for the November 2015 polls was based on the looming crisis and the slogan “after us there is chaos” and its subsequent victory hailed as “victory for democracy” and the fact that democracy and terrorism do not mesh well. Predictably enough President Erdogan in his first major speech prioritized discussions among Parliamentarians for a completely new constitution which would introduce a Presidential form of government since the current one has ‘lost its relevance and become full of details’. He also underlined that Turkey would keep up its fight against the PKK until the rebel group is “eliminated”.

The Turkish dilemma is that if the Iraqi Kurdish vote is opposed too strongly then it will lead to domestic reactions. On the other hand open co-operation with the KRG will be viewed as betrayal by Turkish nationalists who are unhappy over the KRG’s attempts to annex Kirkuk which is identified by them as a traditional Turkmen city. Since President Erdogan requires the support of both groups in the 2019 elections that will give him unprecedented executive, legislative and judicial power this poses a major dilemma for him. However, what is perhaps the greatest predicament for Turkey, and one that it shares with the entire post-colonial space is the question of self-determination which itself is often the complex interplay of quests for identity in a conundrum complicated by vested interest and a history of denial.

Anita

25 August 2017