Post-Galwan options for India’s China policy
Posted on : August 4, 2020Author : AGA Admin
The Galwan tragedy has again highlighted the Chinese stratagem of creating disquiet along the Indian borders. But more than that, it has underlined the limitations of India’s counter-moves. India is aware of a disadvantageous military confrontation. Yet, the Galwan tragedy has forced India to reframe her China policy afresh. The loss of twenty brave soldiers has landed India in a difficult situation where she has to handle Chinese challenge adroitly and gingerly without showing any sign of compromise or weakness. The options at hand are attractive but not promising.
Taking refuge in the Indo-Pacific camp
India has been willing to accommodate the USA for quite some time to counter Chinese threat. It took a definite turn since 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi underlined the all-pervasive nature of India-US relationship, ‘from depths of the ocean to the vastness of the sky’[1] committing for deeper cooperation with the USA in the Indo-Pacific region.[2] India opted to revive the Quad Security Dialogue (with US, Japan and Australia) in 2017,[3] a US initiative to contain China’s rise. It is noteworthy here that except India, other two partners are US’ cold war allies. It puts India directly against China. Is New Delhi ready to take the risk of such an alliance against China? China feels that the US is using India as a pawn to contain her. The Global Times recently wrote, “India’s importance in the US strategic chessboard is proportional
[1] The Statesman (Kolkata), 9th June, 2016, p.1
[2] The Statesman (Kolkata), 13th November, 2017, p.1
[3] Ibid
to how the US views China as a threat.”[1] Taking refuge in the US camp will fetter, if not end, India’s strategic autonomy and will not restrain China. That China is adamant vis-à-vis the US might is clear from her current aggressive South China Sea policy where she continues with her expansion amidst US threat. There is an opinion that the current Chinese strategy is to respond in proportion to any US action at the same level of intensity and seriousness.[2] Also, the Pentagon’s will to confront China to safeguard India’s national interest is questionable. Although USA now considers China a military threat[3] US’ reliability needs to be verified.[4]
However, the Galwan tragedy has enough potential to push India further in the Indo-Pacific camp which is a naval alliance while India’s direct China-threat emanates mainly from the Himalayas. Besides, China is attempting to utilize her Pak connection. There are intelligence reports that Chinese aircrafts are seen in the airstrips in Pak-Occupied Kashmir recently while Chinese army personnel are in touch with the Pak ISI and also Pak terror outfit Al-Badar,[5] enough to make India go jittery. It is pertinent to mention here that on the eve of 1962 war, President Ayub Khan contemplated a grand alliance with China against the common enemy India.[6] At that time there was no Sino-Pak ‘all-weather friendship.’ India’s Indo-Pacific partnership to counter China might encourage the latter to turn more aggressive, from Ladakh to Arunachal, since China is fond of ‘teaching lessons’ and sending messages. India then has to choose between her wider Indo-Pacific strategy and immediate border security strategy which will absorb more investment for the army depriving the navy, integral to Indo-Pacific scheme (the navy is already complaining of decline in budget share[7]). Also, it will be silly to expect the USA to help India recover the Aksai Chin from the Chinese.
Turning offensive at the border
Since the tragedy occurred there is a growing demand in India to turn more offensive at the border adhering to which the government has given ‘free hand’ to the army to handle further
[1] ‘Washington feeds of New Delhi’s impulsiveness’, Global Times, 17th June, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191970.shtml (accessed on 03.07.20)
[1] Ralph Jennings, ‘Why China is Sure to Match US Aircraft Carriers in Disputed Asian Sea’, Voice of America News, July 1, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/why-china-sure-match-us-aircraft-carriers-disputed-asian-sea (accessed on 03.07.20).
[1] ‘China now our biggest military threat, says US’, The Times, 9th July, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-now-our-biggest-military-threat-says-us-3xrdlbd0p (accessed on 10.07.20).
[1]On the US reliability issue see G. Parthasarathy, ‘Is United States a ‘reliable partner?’, The Hindu BusinessLine, 30th May, 2018, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/is-the-united-states-a-reliable-partner/article24038231.ece and Uri Friedman, ‘America Is Alone in Its Cold War With China’, The Atlantic, 17th February, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/us-china-allies-competition/606637/ (accessed on 10.07.20). Former National Adviser to President Trump John Bolton stated recently that President Trump’s support to India against China is not guaranteed. ‘No guarantee Trump will back India against China if tensions escalate: John Bolton’, India Today, July 11, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/no-guarantee-trump-will-back-india-against-china-former-us-nsa-john-bolton-1699539-2020-07-11 (accessed on 20.07.20).
[1] Anandabazar Patrika, 2nd July, 2020, p.6
[1] Bruce Riedel, , JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, The CIA, and the Sino-Indian War, Noida, HarperCollins, 2016, p.90
[1] ‘Navy Chief Admiral Singh flags concern over decline in funds allocation to Navy’, The Economic Times, Dec 3, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/navy-chief-admiral-singh-flags-concern-over-decline-in-funds-allocation-to-navy/articleshow/72350307.cms?from=mdr (accessed on 04.07.20).
aggression.[1] However, the question is how much offensive India can afford to be at the border, risking counter attack? Indeed this is not 1962, but the asymmetry of power between the two neighbours still remains. Although India became the third largest military spender in 2019 after the US and China, the figure was $71.1 billion as against China’s $261 billion.[2] Besides, China can end a full-fledged war, presumably triggered if China considers the Indian move too aggressive like 1962, ‘before a fire is shot’ with her capacity to fight virtual battlefields-cyber, space and electromagnetic-avoiding traditional physical confrontations.[3]Also, actions along LAC might encourage Pakistan to get activated along LoC which has seen a surge in terror intrusion lately amidst tension in Ladakh frontier. During the 1962 war bulk of Indian Army remained at the Pakistan front leaving only weaker units to counter the PLA.[4] It showed which side was a more security concern for India. The challenge still remains.
Inflicting economic injury
The best option seems to be an economic boycott. The growing market of Chinese products had always been a concern for many in India but now it seems to be the Bramhastra, the ultimate lethal weapon to beat the dragon. The government-owned enterprises like the railway have already cancelled Chinese investment proposal of 471 crore rupees in Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridor while the BSNL decided not to buy Chinese parts for its machines. Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT) has appealed Indian corporate bodies to shun using Chinese items in their businesses.[5] The government has also banned 59 Chinese mobile applications in India and imposed tariffs on Chinese products. These measures are expected to hurt the Chinese business hard. China applies similar tactics too, latest on Australia, punishing her for advocating for international enquiry of China’s Covid-complicity.[6] However, the question remains how much injury this will inflict on China? It is feared that the ban on import of cheap Chinese products will have manifold ramifications on lockdown-hit Indian economy like hurting the vendors who prefer cheap Chinese products over local ones,[7]the business at the ports where 25-30 percent of the imported items are Chinese[8] and most importantly the businesses in India who depend on Chinese products of APIs or active pharmaceutical ingredients and fabrics. Indian businesses will be hard hit in case China reciprocates since China is a big market for Indian exporters.
Viable option, diplomacy
The economic boycott is worth trying but with preparations. Australia will suffer more from Chinese boycott since the latter is the biggest market of her products while China finds alternative sources in the US and Latin America. Thus the main concern is the alternative to Chinese products. In case of mobile applications, the Modi government has launched Atmanirbhar Innovation Challenge[9] to promote Indian mobile applications to substitute the Chinese. But to sustain an Indian economy sans Chinese products (if feasible) a wide range of preparations is required from manufacturing of Chinese substitutes locally, arranging for alternate sources for raw materials as well as final markets. India lacks these preparations. The Atmanirbhar Bharat mission, if successful, will be helpful thereby giving a strong weapon to India for her future strategic calculations. Besides, a strong economy boosts a stronger military, for example China. But for now the best option is diplomatic choreography with vigilance at the border. Also, India now should reach out to her South Asian neighbours to safeguard her interest against Chinese diplomatic and economic aggression and make it costly for them to opt for China-card against India. It is more prudent for India to counter China diplomatically, for now.
——————————————————-x——————————————————-
Subhadeep Bhattacharya
Senior Adjunct Researcher, AGA
[1] Dipankar Peri, ‘Ladakh face-off: Armed forces given ‘free hand’ to respond to situation in LAC’, The Hindu, June 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/armed-forces-told-to-forcefully-deal-with-chinese-aggression-along-lac/article31881949.ece (accessed on 04.07.20).
[2] ‘India third largest military spender in the world, after US and China’, The Economic Times, April 27, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/global-military-spending-saw-largest-increase-in-decade-in-2019-china-india-in-top-3-study/articleshow/75404166.cms?from=mdr (accessed on 04.07.20).
[3] Pravin Sawney, ‘China’s PLA Capable of Fighting Transformational Algorithm War; India’s Old Resolution Mechanisms Won’t Work’, Outllook, 29 June 2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/chinas-plas-ability-to-fight-transformational-algorithm-war-a-danger-old-resolution-mechanisms-wont-work/303346 (accessed on 04.07.20).
[4] Bruce Riedel, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis, p.90
[5] The Statesman (Kolkata), 25th June, 2020, p.8
[6] The Guardian, 19th May, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/20/why-has-china-slapped-tariffs-on-australian-barley-and-what-can-australia-do-about-it (accessed on 07.07.20)
[7] The Statesman (Kolkata), 25th June, 2020, p.3
[8] Anandabazar Patrika, 1st July, 2020, p.8
[9] Ministry of Electronics and IT, 4th July, 20, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1636407 (accessed on 07.07.20).
Leave a Reply