Ploughing A Lonely Furrow – On Imran Khan’s Fallout with the “Militablishment”

“All countries have armies, but in Pakistan, it is the Army that has a country.” Such an enduring proposition offered by nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, has been vindicated yet again, as Islamabad stares at a politico-militaristic abyss. Though, Imran Khan had stormed into the office, albeit with a wafer-thin majority in the Nation Assembly, it was maintained by commentators that the fractured state of opposition, institutionalized graft, economic downturn, coupled with Khan’s charismatic sway, would facilitate a seamless completion of his electoral tenure. [A caveat is indeed essential for the readers, that the Khan government, might already be on its way out, by the time, this piece gets published].  But, at this critical juncture, it seems apparent that Khan has lost the requisite credence among the Pakistani “militablishment”, necessary to continue functioning. While his likely defeat in the impending no-trust motion, might not see outcries among the political elites, over democratic backsliding in Islamabad, an improbable victory would see an irreversible erosion of his political wherewithal.

However, it is imperative to scrutinize the dominant factors and motivations in the politico-economic milieu of Pakistan, which culminated in such an imbroglio. At the very outset, one needs to unpack the defining aspirations and positions, spelt out and held respectively by Khan, throughout his electoral campaign in 2018. Khan avowedly proclaimed to herald an Islamist welfare state rather than a reformist economy driven by growth, relentlessly lambasted the developed West as the singular cause for problems in Pakistan, and did not conceal his contempt for the supposed corruption gnawing at the roots of the political system, which he sought to quell, a la Trump. Notwithstanding, the high-pitched pronouncements, his tenure in office made them appear as political perfidy.

The government under his reins, was soon castigated for weaponizing institutions as the National Accountability Bureau for political vendetta – to settle scores with Nawaz Sharif and former President Asif Ali Zardari – while no less than the judicial arms of the state, censured the regime for arbitrarily circumventing the Parliament, for political ends. Needless to aver, the explicit high-handedness of the Khan government, compelled arch-enemies Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) to coalesce.

If Khan’s maladroit diplomatic manoeuvres along the Western terrains – especially when it needed to invest in gaining “strategic depth” in Afghanistan – or his contentious comments against the European Union in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine fallout, was much to the chagrin of the military apparatus, it was the economic degeneration under his watch, which turned the economic elites against him. While the astronomically high rate of inflation, estimated to be 12%, may be juxtaposed against a workable 5%, inherited by Khan, it is equally dispiriting, that the Pakistani currency has depreciated to almost half of its value, when Khan assumed office. Unsurprisingly, an official retort from the Ministry of Finance, has dismissed the trends as distorted narratives, attesting the temporary setback as a logical outcome of the global pandemic and Ukraine crisis. However, such a banal argument does not hold water, as one examines the broader macroeconomic patterns in Pakistan even before the onset of COVID,  with economic growth plummeting to an abysmal 3% and fiscal deficit precariously operating around 7%. Despite, an elaborate financial dole from the IMF to tide over the crisis, the Khan government failed to radically rejig its economy or usher in reforms, due to his long-held anti-Western stance to placate his illiberal core constituency.

While a bird’s-eye view is critical for discerning the conundrum, one needs to effectively complement that with a localized perspective, for a more grounded understanding. In that regard, one may turn to political commentator Fahd Hussain’s telling insights on how the fantasy of “Naya Pakistan” went “sour”. Hussain captured that the PTI was inefficacious in forging a “working relationship” with their political opponents, absence of which, failed to soothe the political heat, or infuse a cooperative dimension in governance. However, Khan missed the wood for the tress, and chose to pick the “wrong targets”. Hussain further submitted, that the “interesting choice” of Usman Buzdar as the chief minister of the Punjab province of Pakistan, failed to pay dividends, owing to governance stasis and policy paralysis. The perceptional setback was further consolidated, especially when juxtaposed against the Shahbaz Sharif years. Equally important, the cabinet composition, noted Hussain, was grossly inept to address the burgeoning issues, further explaining the routine reshuffle Khan was forced to undertake. While there were competent administrators as Dr. Sania Nishtar or Dr. Faisal Sultan, they were largely the exceptions, and not the norm. Consequently, the leading departments of finance, energy or information, suffered from incessant volatility due to recurrent change of reins. Finally, the mistaken “sense of entitlement” and utter contempt and disregard for the political adversaries, with the inarticulate spokespersons failing to imbue the political system with “hope, inclusivity and a feel-good factor”, was definitely the straw that broke the camel’s back, at least within the political circuit.

At this point, it is instructive to interrogate the militaristic dimensions involved in the potential political egress of the Khan government. It is well-documented that Imran Khan consciously stalled the change of guard in ISI, given the critical role played by the outgoing Director General Faiz Hameed, in installing Khan to the seat of power. Through a political meddling in military choices, Khan crossed the very “lakshman-rekha”, which has precipitated brusque removals of the political premiers in the post-Zia paradigm in Pakistan. The Marxist quip – “History repeats itself, first as a tragedy, second as a farce” – seems pertinent here, given Khan’s blindness to the historical precedents.

Back in the 1990s, Nawaz Sharif was the poster-boy for the “militablishment”, given his populist Islamism, fuel to extremist elements, conflated with his long-term goals of Islamization of educational spaces and devising a legal framework in harmony with religious diktats. However, his subliminal endeavors in jeopardizing the preponderant authority of the military through monetary temptation, peeved the then army chief Asif Nawaz. There were clashes over between the two office holders over the fresh appointments for the ISI chief. Akin to Khan’s predicament, General Nawaz ensured the retirement of Lt. General Hamid Gul– who had propelled Sharif to power. Sharif’s incessant efforts at impeding an Asif loyalist from becoming the ISI chief, ultimately marked his downfall.

The re-election of Sharif, witnessed fresh acrimony between him and the new army chief General Jehangir Karamat, as the latter was outraged at his consent not being sought, for a decision on the ISI chief, and subsequently pressed for a National Security Council, for greater autonomy in militaristic involvement in the realm of politics. Finally, following the sacking of Karamat, the appointment of General Pervez Musharraf  was the coup de grace, for this supposed Sharif loyalist  did not bat an eyelid before turning against his master, in the aftermath of Kargil, and ousted the prime minister, in an orchestrated overthrow.

A robust analysis of such a political ecosystem in Pakistan can be adequately discerned, by revisiting the instructive text, “Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military”, where diplomat Husain Haqqani denoted the culture as “military rule by other means”. In a similar vein, scholar Hasan-Askari Rizvi, in “The Military and Politics in Pakistan”, posited that the army chief exemplified a “pivot” in the political dispensation, embodying administrative agreement of the military over every facet of the state policy, through rigorous deliberations with his military peers.

Returning to the present conundrum, Imran Khan has dubiously asserted that a conspiratorial cabal has devised a nefarious ploy to destabilize his nation, and unseat him from power, with the fast-approaching no-confidence vote, being just another component of the pre-scripted plan. Equally surprising, Khan has stated that, he has procured a “letter”, which validates the same, which has been promptly shared with the intelligence agencies and military. However, it is implicit that, the political theatrics around Khan would never have pervaded the public discourse, had this “conspiracy” thesis been authentic and known to Rawalpindi, and had Khan had the blessings of the military. Hence, the argument is simply a convenient instrument, to make the formal constitutional process of his possible ouster, look null and void.

Amidst his near political bankruptcy, it is essential to note how Khan lauded the strategic autonomy of New Delhi, eulogizing how India had remained unswerving in importing Russian oil, despite being a member of QUAD and with the threat of American sanctions looming large. Such a marked departure, reeks of diplomatic tokenism and political opportunism to survive the quagmire, given his traditionally anti-India positions on Kashmir, his distinct discourse on Islamophobia, his tacit consent to terrorism against New Delhi, and finally his vitriolic attacks against Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In the wake of any new governmental framework in Islamabad, any form of diplomatic outreach from New Delhi might be risk-laden, given the makeshift nature of the arrangement, with elections scheduled for August 2023.

In closing, one is reminded of how chronicler A.J.P. Taylor, while reflecting on the revolutions of 1848-1849, had famously argued that, “German history reached a turning point, but failed to turn”. It succinctly captures the “hybrid” democracy of Pakistan where to this date, militancy is preferred over liberalism, populism over reformation, and leaders persist as lame ducks. Perhaps, Imran Khan is not the last Pakistani premier to plough a lonely furrow.

References

1. Patil, Sameer (2022). “Pakistan PM Imran Khan’s downfall is unlikely to change India-Pakistan ties”. In Observer Research Foundation. (28^th March, 2022).

(https://www.orfonline.org/research/pakistan-pm%E2%80%89imran-khans-downfall/)

2. Swami, Praveen (2022). “Imran Khan’s fall is a win for Pakistan’s Generals, not its democracy”. In The PRINT. (27^th March, 2022).

(https://theprint.in/opinion/security-code/imran-khans-fall-is-a-win-for-pakistans-generals-not-its-democracy/888208/)

3. “Pakistan’s ‘selected’ PM has won few friends at home or abroad. His likely early exit from office will not be lamented”. In The Indian Express. (25^th March, 2022).

(https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/pakistan-imran-likely-early-exit-from-office-will-not-be-lamented-7835050/)

4. Jamal, Umair (2022). “Imran Khan Fights For His Survival”. In THE DIPLOMAT. (28^th March, 2022).

(https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/imran-khan-fights-for-his-survival/)

5. Sharma, Mihir (2022). “Imran Khan has only himself to blame for his fall from grace”. In The PRINT. (25^th March, 2022).

(https://theprint.in/opinion/imran-khans-has-only-himself-to-blame-for-his-fall-from-grace/887628/)

6. Husain, Fahd (2022). “Why did the PTI fail?”. In DAWN. (2^nd April, 2022).

(https://www.dawn.com/news/1683029)

Guest Column by Ratnadeep Maitra, former Intern, Asia in Global Affairs
The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the author, in his personal capacity. It does not reflect the policies and perspectives of Asia in Global Affairs.