Multilateral Forums and Connectivity

India’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been through a much debated process where the advantages and disadvantages of membership into a multilateral forum that would include not just Russia and China but also Pakistan has been subject to intense scrutiny not just by commentators from within India but also globally. A recent rather positive editorial begins with the argument that entry into the SCO opens up opportunities for India to its North. A refreshing change from many others that have argued that ‘look north/northwest’ would never be a viable policy option for India given the intractable position of Pakistan and the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan that make ‘Look/Act East’ the only available Indian alternative, the editorial goes on to argue that entry into the SCO would provide opportunities in three key areas. First the SCO would become a forum where Pakistan could be held accountable for its terrorism secondly it could be a forum for negotiation of India’s relations with China and finally it would resolve the issue of non-contiguity with the Central Asian region by opening up lines of communication through Pakistan and Afghanistan.

While moving away from a position that completely diminishes Indian interests in the Northwest, there is also reason to critically assess the role that the SCO is being assigned as a negotiator for bilateral issues. And here one needs to take note not just of the intent of the original founders of Shanghai Five but also how the Organization itself has responded to various situations within the ambit of its core space and its immediate neighbourhood.A myriad of bilateral military and economic links within the SCO has often prevented it from developing a multilateral response in critical situations. While its lack of reaction to the ‘war on terror’ in its initial years was justified with the argument that Afghanistan was not a part of the organization, this continued in the case of conflicts emerging out of domestic power politics or even critical moments within the region like Andijan(2005) or Osh (2010) that involved member states and led to ethnic clashes and movements of people across borders.

Member states have remained deadlocked over appropriate action in case of issues that have been identified as internal to states, security actionin case of cross border issues and most importantly expansion through introduction of new members. Greater attention has been paid by both Russia and China to developing bilateral relations with the member Central Asian states and alternative economic forums like the Eurasian Economic Community have emerged within the same space with the SCO failing to provide a collective economic potential. Diverging internal and foreign economic policies, varying commitments to institutions like the WTO or even the Russia led Customs Union, the absence of a free trade zone and underdeveloped infrastructure has impeded intra SCO economic potential.

Issues where there has been general agreement among SCO members includepreventing bilateral issues from clouding the overall SCO agenda and non-interference in bilateral or domestic matters. The lack of SCO involvement in Osh in 2010, was not just a reflection on the SCO’s crisis management capabilities but also one of non-interference and has been matched by the lack of involvement during the Uzbek-Tajik feud over regional hydropower resources which led to Uzbekistan’s blockade of rail shipments of equipment that Tajikistan needed to construct the Rogun Dam. Non-interference has extended to ‘color revolutions’ with a broad definition of ‘security threats’ and contending definitions of ‘political change’ and ‘regional autonomy’ encouraging inaction.

In fact over the years the inclusion of India and Pakistan within the forum has been debated and withheld on the ground that they would bring with them a plethora of bilateral issues that would overshadow critical developmental and security issues within the Central Asian space. The rather optimistic assumption that this would be transformed with their participation in the Tashkent based Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure and projected joint exercises with other SCO members anticipates not just resolution of long standing disputes but also the political and economic influence and deep seated interest of other states. Over the years various other contending interests have been inserted into the relationship the most recent being the much publicized Chinese initiative the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

On the day India joined the SCO as a member S Akbar Zaidi, noted political economist from Pakistan, argued in the course of a lecture in Kolkata[1] that the most dangerous implication of the CPECis that it would prevent any rapprochement between India and Pakistan unless the Chinese themselves initiate such a process and that they would do only if that fits into their grand design in the region. Is the Indian entry into the SCO part of this grand design where the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ would encourage overlook on sovereignty issues? While this and many other questions remain unanswered the inevitability of larger logistical spaces emerging as significant alternatives to multilateral forums seems to be ascendant at the intersection of global geopolitics and geo-economics.

Anita

14 June 2017

[1] S Akbar Zaidi, “Can China Take Over Pakistan” at a lecture organized by Calcutta Research Group and Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Kolkata 9 June 2017 which is part of their project on A Social Mapping of Infrastructure, Logistics and India’s Look East Policy.