Modi’s Multi-Aligned Bharat

The celebrated Kautilya – whose Arthashastrawas infamously dubbed by Weber as “truly radical Machiavellianism” – had once quipped how one could never conceptualize any “friendship without any self-interest”. Such a pithy observation is largely fitting within the extant geopolitical churnings in general and foreign policy in particular, wherein substance and style require a harmonious blending to elicit optimum expediency.Viewed in this light, the essay would be an exercise to locate the foreign policy stratagem of the current ruling dispensation in India, through a succinct theoretical re-reading of the diplomatic tone, tenor and legacy of its predecessors.
It may be averred that the policy orientations of New Delhi have advanced through three distinctive epochs, albeit with significant overlapping – non-alignment, strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. The initial non-aligned phase of a socio-economically brittle postcolonial nation-state was marked by Nehruvian liberal internationalism, largely premised on global justice, poverty alleviation, departure from watertight bloc politics and an unequivocal rejection of nuclearization of great powers. Such a bonhomie with lofty moral precepts marked its cessation in the wake of the Chinese incursions of 1962, therein ushering in the subsequent epoch of strategic autonomy. This era which was functional till the dismantling of the Soviet Union , made clinical departures in the form of territorial armament, increased assertion towards neighbors, economic self-reliance supplemented with developmental equity for the “periphery”.
However, the transnational nature of the challenges of the post-Cold War paradigmentailed that neither geopolitical isolationism nor any formalized constitution of alliances would be a wholly adequate diplomatic rejoined, thereby setting the stage for New Delhi’s multi-aligned posturing for an increasingly multi-polar global order.This crystallized in its totality under the current dispensation,involving greater engagement with a multitude of multilateral and minilateral platforms – SCO, BRICS, G20, UNGA or even the Paris Climate Change Summit as the cases in point, enhanced formal-informal collaborations with nations on diverse policy areas, and finally through a sustained mechanism of “normative hedging” – as the power to shape what is morally credible at the systemic level. Such a prescriptive posturing remains deeply intertwined with soft power calculus – the ideational locus of India’s foreign policy. It must be maintained, that a level-of-analysis framework to soft power directs towards the individual level –a derivative of the subjective preferences and orientations of the leadership. Elements such as Buddhism, yoga, Sufism or even heritage occasions as Kumbh Mela, have been secularized and exhibited to the proverbial Occidental, as a marker of an Indian exceptionalism – a philosophically profound, spiritually robust and unconditionally pacifist belief-system.
Such a simultaneous stipulation for bolstering hard material power in sync with spiritual acumen, expatiates Modi’s instrumentalization of foreign policy for “national interest”, divorced from any dithering about the innenpolitikof the partner nation. A seamless synthesis of domestic economic prerequisites, long-term strategic commitments as well as sustainable collaborative projects with time-tested partners gets vindicated by Modi’s welcoming embrace of foreign capital despite internal opprobrium, his conceptualization of SAGAR and the timely transition of Look East to Act East, Act Far East and subsequently Act West Asia. Moreover, the deployment of “non-military preemptive action” against a geopolitically whimsical Pakistan by taking recourse to the institutional arrangements of Financial Action Task Force and the International Court of Justice, conveniently contrasts a “responsible” New Delhi vis-à-vis a “rogue” Islamabad, underscoring the civilizational high ground of the former.
However, such a strand of realism with its concomitant instinct of self-aggrandization posits significant challenges in the immediacy of neighborhood. It is imperative to aver that the postcolonial history of India, was characterized by the subcontinent as an “exclusive” theatre of Indian influence, albeit following a conventional style of democratic promotion. The content of such a project entailed exemplary leadership patterns for the others to follow suit, without earning the perception of a regional bully. It was complemented with a zero-tolerance policy towards external intervention from great powers. The outlook hit its crescendo with the Gujral doctrine of non-reciprocity to augment intra-regional goodwill. However, contemporary scholarship has posited the growing unpopularity of New Delhi in regional capitals, in the wake of an increasing proclivity, to intervene and mold the domestic political contours of its smaller neighbors.
Having examined the core tenets of the Modi doctrine, it may be rationally asserted that there was been a visible metamorphosis from a Nehruvian idealism towards a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Herein, the category of “pragmatism” can be construed as a shorthand for a “less doctrinaire”, more “self-help” laden engagement.However, a deconstruction of the constituent elements of such a pragmatism, would showcase that it is analytically fragile on substantive terms. Rather, it is apposite to conceptualize it as a “procedural pragmatism”, premised on an adaptation of the Hindutva ideology to the already well-entrenched institutional mechanisms of foreign policy – conflating supposedly incompatible ideas and forces to provide contextual responses to “political and cultural logics”. The methodology would presume that every ideational dynamic is subject to restructuring and balancing, contingent on the emanating benefits.
The manifestation of such a process in place, may be located at two disparate levels. While the socially conservative position of the current ruling dispensation was construed as a potential irritant to any healthy partnership with the deeply religious nations of the Islamic Middle East, the vibrant economic exchanges with the same, vindicate how “procedural pragmatism” had relegated the “politico-religious project” of the Bharatiya Janata Party, to the backburner in such an interaction. Equally important, the complete mirror image of such an exercise, could be visible in the increasedpush for Hindi as a linguistic medium in diplomacy, gifting of Hindu artefacts and religious canons as Bhagvad Gita to foreign delegations, or sending diplomatic probationers to Kumbh Mela festivals as a part of “protocol attachments” – culminating in a certain “saffronization of diplomacy”. At a similar level, Modi’s positive engagement with the states-as-stakeholders on the question of para-diplomacy follows a singularity of logic, different from the extensive powers vested in the PMO with respect to foreign policy decision making.
In conclusion, one must submit that under Narendra Modi, the position of New Delhi in the global theatre, has hit a geopolitical sweet spot. Thereby, it is imperative that India remains an “aligned-state” but on issues, a “leading power” and not just a “balancer”, and finally a calculated “risk taker” and not simply a passively“cautious power”.

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Ratnadeep Maitra
Adjunct Researcher, Asia in Global Affairs

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