MARITIME NAVAL SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: THE QUESTION OF CHINESE PREPONDERANCE

The Indian Ocean, in terms of geo-politics, is perhaps the most important water body, both in terms of trade and security. From times of yore, it has been specifically eyed by Europe, and its trade routes have been of paramount importance to the colonial enterprise. All of the world powers have vied for dominating the Indian Ocean, the effects of which have been more pronounced and more visible with the passage of time. The spatial significance of the Indian Ocean, and the multiplicity of routes that are associated with it, comes up as lucrative, but with it, arises a very significant issue, that of security.

According to Sugata Bose, the very act of crossing and re-crossing the ocean makes it, ‘a symbol of universal humanity’ (Bose 2006: 10). Robert Kaplan, in the introduction to his work, Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, has stated, ‘China expands vertically, India horizontally’ (Kaplan 2007). The end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization brought in its wake, the growth of a multiplicity of economic powers. It should be noted that the growth of multipolarity has a very deep relationship with the geopolitical aspects surrounding the Indian Ocean. The vibrant economies of China, India and the growth of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), with their cheap labour and open markets attracted a lot of investments, and the bountiful trade routes of the Indian Ocean flourished.

The resurgence of the importance of the position of the Indian Ocean has brought along with it, growing changes in the power dynamics in the Asian geopolitical scenario. The growth of Chinese hard power in the recent times along with its economic and technological advancements has seriously challenged the unipolarity and suzerainty that had been formerly enjoyed by the United States. A very significant aspect of the Chinese expansion can be envisioned most prominently in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a reawakening of the Silk Route, that finds China using its huge resources and labour in creating a pan Asian impact, whilst keeping itself at the centre.

The Mandarin name for China is Zhong guo, which literally means the Middle Kingdom, and that does not mean, between other rival kingdoms, but simply ‘to all that lies between Heaven and Earth’ (Allison 2017: 109). This is something that is becoming increasingly more visible in China’s position with regards to the Indian Ocean. With regard to the Indian Ocean, it should be noted that there are several stakeholders that exercise significant influence and are deeply involved with it; the least, they will be expecting, is Chinese preponderance in that region. The creation of bounded spaces in the form of ‘territorial waters’ and ‘international waters’ are extremely murky and are subjected to high contestation amongst two or more States. Added to it, is the additional pressure of sea-pirates, especially from Somalia, who have more than once attacked merchant ships. It is under such precarious and pernicious conditions that the future of the Indian Ocean rests.

India, China, the ASEAN, USA, European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea are important stakeholders in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region. The relationship of India to the Indian Ocean is an extremely important one. As David Scott notes, there is a ‘two-fold context’ with regards to the presence of India in the Indian Ocean, namely, the simultaneous growth of India and China, and secondly, the paradigmatic shift of focus from land to maritime security, over the years (Scott 2015). In fact, of particular importance, with regards to this paradigm shift is the envisioning of policies like that of the Look East Policy that has been rephrased as the Act East Policy post-2014. In fact, of significant importance is the process of conversion of India’s seemingly Brown water Navy into Blue water Navy, with increased armaments and more technological prowess, as well as holding joint naval exercises with the other important stakeholders. The existence of a multitude of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), and added to it, its own financial and economic needs, China has indeed began to take steps to ramp up its security, especially in case of the armaments used by the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN). The disputes over the territorial islands in the South China Sea have also been an issue of great contention, especially the Spratly-Paracel Islands.  

It is important at this point to invoke the role of US engagement in the Indian Ocean. The United States has constantly harped on the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2011, US President Barack Obama had declared the “strategy of a ‘pivot’, a shift that entailed a strong military commitment to the Asia-Pacific” (Pant and Joshi 2015: 48). In fact, the reason for this alteration in the policy narrative is directly related to the assertive and aggressive Chinese nature as could be witnessed in the East and South China Seas. This nature has been described by John J. Mearsheimer as ‘offensive realism’, and he has predicted a possible scenario wherein the global hegemony enjoyed by USA lies to be challenged by China, especially on the grounds of its rapid economic growth and rapid strides in defence technology (Mearsheimer 2014).

It is under such conditions that Leon Panetta, the then American Secretary of Defence had mentioned that ‘defence cooperation with India is a lynchpin in this strategy’ (Pant and Joshi 2015). In fact, the pivot strategy has not only put significant emphasis upon the increase in US naval presence in the region, but has also put enormous importance upon the presence of India as a potential naval power in the region. In this respect, it is important to note what Maria Bastos has to say in that respect. Bastos focuses on the channelling of antagonisms into Agonisms (Bastos 2014). Her focus upon multi-polarity is more constructivist than realist in its outlook. According to her, China focuses more upon energy (oil and gas), minerals and ores. This outlook of external development shall prevent it from indulging in conflict, while continuing to place claims in case of territorial disputes. However, it should be noted that Bastos’ focus on the rose of blocs wherein USA, India and China shall have their hegemonies, is something that can be said to be a huge step towards the decimation of Chinese preponderance.

Another important point in this respect has been raised by Scott, in 2011, regarding the relationship between China and India. The 1962 Indo-China War experienced a massive souring of relationships between the two Nation-States, yet, with the advent of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, both have come together, keeping their differences aside, to create conditions for mutual peace and harmony, while indulging in competition. However, China’s all weather friendship with Pakistan and its small border skirmishes with Indian troops especially along the North Eastern part of India, do not speak a lot about cooperation or ‘Chindia’, a term used by Jairam Ramesh, an Indian politician, and something that has been dealt in detail by J.D. James.

According to David Brewster, there is the existence of a certain Chinese stubbornness with relation to its viewing of Indian interests in the Indian Ocean. He mentions the sudden visit by a Chinese nuclear submarine at Colombo, and a simultaneous Chinese incursion along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The timed occurrences of both of these events had a significant negative impact, which could be seen in the visit to India, planned by President Xi Jingping. There would be considerable tensions across the tables, and that would prevent a fruitful discussion. (Brewster 2016) In fact, the constant maneuvers by the PLA Navy to undermine India’s position in its own backyard have not been taken very positively. The IOR-ARC, or the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, which consists of 20 members including India, Malaysia, Singapore, UAE and South Africa, amongst others, can be said to be a bloc that Bastos has been talking about. In fact, as Scott notes, India has indeed thwarted attempts made by China to enter the association as a full member, and has instead had to become a dialogue partner like USA, Japan, UK and others.

It should be noted in this regard as to how relations between India and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have evolved. In fact, it should be noted India’s efforts in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Corridor (BIMSTEC), as well as the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), did pave the path for its Look East Policy that has now been rechristened as the Act East Policy. In fact, the view of Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister that ‘India would be a useful balance to China’s heft’, and also, India’s participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) shows that China’s actions to demean the Indian position at the face of Asian regionalism has indeed backfired. In fact, the logic of China as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ that Xi Jingping has highlighted and Graham Allison had interpreted as similar to the ‘Make China Great Again’, has indeed backfired in the international arena.

However, China’s most important policy with regards to the Indian Ocean is the development of the Maritime Silk Route, and that has involved the development of several key ports along the Indian Ocean. This is something that has not been taken very positively by the other powers. The idea of the ‘String of Pearls’ around India, has been considered very menacing and has been countered with the development of India’s own set of pearls (Brewster 2016). Thus, it can be stated that suzerainty over the naval security mechanism of the Indian Ocean is indeed highly contested.

Added to this discourse, is the presence of the US air and naval power at the island of Diego Garcia, something that both India and China had challenged. However, India, as of now has changed its stance with regards to its understanding of the Indian Ocean, from geography of threat to geography of opportunity (Scott 2015).

In fact, the presence of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has led to several geo-strategists asserting its usage as a potential chokepoint. As Brahma Chellaney notes, ‘The Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, in the Bay of Bengal, is a critical asset for India to counter China’s growing maritime presence… India can potentially play the same game… by establishing China-style maritime militias established by the Indian Coast Guard’ (Chellaney 2017). He also asserts that ‘Chinese unilateralism in the Indian Ocean’ can be solely challenged by such concrete steps. The unwanted forays by the PLA Navy in territorial waters of other Asian countries is something that is not just unwanted, but also is construed as unwarranted muscle-flexing that further intensifies the state of anarchy whilst sowing the seeds for conflict.

The year 2020 has brought along with it, certain unique circumstances, with regards to the functioning of maritime naval security. The spread of SARS Cov-2 has significantly affected the functioning of multilateral and regional forums, as well as the various security forums. The certain association of the spread of the virus, attributed to Wuhan city in China, has certainly created tensions. Added to the furor is the fact, that China has continued with its policies of muscle flexing, with regards to Hong Kong and Taiwan, and had a most recent stand-off with the US, as well as mounting pressure with the land borders in India. These circumstances are not directly associated with the matter at hand of naval security and maritime geopolitical domination, but they cannot be left out from the discourse that is in progress.

According to Schrader, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a process of “reexamination” of relations, by several countries like Australia and Czech Republic, with China. The interference in the democratic processes of the polity has been referred to occur through a three-fold measure of “covert, coercive or corrupting”. The manipulative measures have been identified to occur due to five important factors:

“1. Weaponization of China’s economy;

2. Attempts to dominate the global conversation about China;
3. A reliance on elite intermediaries;
4. Targeting the Chinese diaspora;
5. A tendency to embed authoritarian norms.” (Schrader 2020)

China continues to pursue a strategy that puts it at the helm of the world order, perhaps the very centre of it. The race riots in USA, the COVID-19 crisis – wherein China came forward with massive aid mechanisms has certainly bolstered its soft power image in the world arena. However, attempts at highlighting the presence of faulty N-95 masks and PPE kits, by the West, has not gone unnoticed, but has made little or no dent to the picture of the savior that China beholds momentarily. The erratic remarks made by the US President, Donald J. Trump, has turned him a scapegoat to his own game. His handling of hydroxychloroquine imports from India and constant jibes at the World Health Organization (WHO), do certainly affect US soft power. The Chinese diplomatic process of inducing pressure, whilst maintaining a stance of moral superiority, surely has much similarity to classical realist analysis, and the effects of this, are clearly visible, as USA and India are cozying up, as India has to face the Chinese at Ladakh and the Nepalese at Bihar.

The PLA Navy (PLAN), with its large scale supply of relief materials to different parts of the world has certainly earned some accolades to its name. Deployment of warships to the South China Sea, as a move of provocation, did involve some mild protest from USA, India, Japan and Australia, but the perilous internal conditions caused by the pandemic, has led to a very checked reaction to the deployment. Repeated border skirmishes between India and China along the Galwan Valley region in Ladakh, with great troop deployment on both sides and subsequent attempts at de-escalation failed, following a full-scale physical altercation between both the sides, where according to certain reports, around 20 Indian soldiers and 43 Chinese soldiers were killed. This has led to a serious condition of contention between the two powers (Ramachandran 2020; Shapoo, 2020). With India securing a non-permanent seat, with 2/3rds of the total number of votes cast, to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2021-22 biennium’s, further pressure continues to mount upon Beijing that has responded by moving troops to the Tibet sector (Lakshman 2020). According to some reports, this has been the largest border skirmish between India and China, since the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

The nature of the this skirmish has led to creation of conditions of unprecedented volatility that has affected the present balance of power, not only in South Asia, but in the global international order. Although, both sides have ruled out, the deployment of their naval capabilities at the moment, however, preserving the status quo is a rather tumultuous and difficult ordeal. Keeping in consideration, the fact that both China and India have been severely affected by the conditions of COVID-19, both the nation-states would not be satiated, with the addition of economic sanctions to their already existing set of inconveniences. However, the changes of escalation of conflict remain too high, as the options of conflict resolution remain rather narrow and the vitiating factors, leading to escalation remain rather high. The additional pressure posed by Nepal, receiving tacit support from China (something that several geo-political observers have tended to refute), over the Kalapani region, has certainly created a greater pressure upon India (Xavier 2020; Raja Mohan 2020).

The pandemic has led to conditions resulting in a global recession. In such a moment, it should not be mistaken that the process of dominating the Indian Ocean has assumed a position of secondary importance. In fact, based on the active role that is assumed by the Chinese armed forces, it must be stated that COVID-19 has presented conditions that are extremely fruitful to the growth of its preponderant stance, with almost little or no available opposition. Only time will tell, as to which side, the waters shall roll. All that can be said for now is that situations have been less precarious before, and the coming days shall look into greater diplomatic intervention in addressing the security and trade-related questions in the Indian Ocean Region.

Raunak Bhattacharya

Intern, AGA

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