Looking Back: Reading the Arab Uprisings

The Arab uprisings, which began with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia in 2010, inducted a period of contentious politics, which has restructured the landscape of regional politics and defied the theories that have dominated the literature on the comparative politics of the Middle East. For the last several decades the political science literature on the region focussed on the resilience of engrained authoritarianism, the comparative weakness of civil society and the seeming restricted effect of the dissemination of new norms and notions through new information and communications technology. The initial reactions to the uprisings perhaps exaggerated their uniqueness and possibility and whether the surge in confrontational political action will actually usher in lasting political change remains extremely unclear. It is also difficult to quantify and explain the political changes that have ensued. The overwhelming pace of the Arab Spring has now given way to a persistent, distrait and increasingly violent set of intertwined conflicts for control.

The Arab uprisings of 2011 entail a vigorous model of political contention that takes into consideration the interface of various actors incorporating multiple levels of analysis. The interconnected political and media space in which these revolutions spread-out were possibly one of the most distinguishing characteristics of this period, entrenched in the long-lasting evolution of the pan-Arab media such as Al-Jazeera and the merging of global activist networks in the years leading up to the protests. However those shared themes played out in separate political arenas, each with a distinctive accepted history, ethnic and sectarian composition and political balance of forces. The vigour of these protests was ultimately grounded in the face of the power and resolve of those regimes that did not capitulate to the original ferociousness, exposing significant alignments in the nature of regime resilience and the significance of diverse forms of endurance. The new upsurge of confrontational politics should be perceived as a limited but grave challenge to much of the conformist literature on the comparative politics of the Middle East.

The uprisings undermined not only the regimes themselves but also the conclusions of a refined literature that evolved over the preceding decade to explicate the resilience of authoritarian Arab states. However, it is too early to conclude that the literature’s emphasis on resilient authoritarianism was injudicious. Hybrid authoritarianism has proven more resistant than perceived in the initial days of 2011. Actually, the viciousness of the pushback against popular mobilization across the region following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the descent of multiple cases into civil wars rather than smooth transitions, and the continuing power of the old guard in both Egypt and Tunisia all suggest the enduring applicability of authoritarian structures. Sustained attention on the resilience and power of state institutions may help Middle East specialists avoid errors in other regions by not yielding to enthusiasm for the democrats and keeping a close eye on the autocrats. At the same time, this continued focus on the real power of states and authoritarian regimes may blind observers to the evident changes in the tone and matter of politics across the region. Most Arab autocrats may have persisted thus far but almost all are proposing previously inconceivable concessions, and their societies are more prepared than at any time in the recent past. The dramatic and rapid upsurge of popular mobilization did not come out of nowhere, as some people may have imagined. Indeed, for most part of the decade of 2000s, popular protests had increasingly characterized Arab politics; a fact either ignored or missed out by the specialists on the region.

No Arab uprising has so far led to a genuine democratic transition, even as many countries in the region face an obstinate mobilization and political instability. The authoritarian retention, accompanied by Syria’s slide towards extreme violence and the existential difficulties of the Egyptian and Tunisian transitions, provides a sobering remedial to the initial eagerness for far-reaching radical change. At some level, this retention justifies the last decade’s close inquiry of the practices and constructs nourishing these authoritarian systems, and it ascertains the trouble of moving past such profoundly deep-seated political and societal structures. At the same time, one has to concede that the essential fabric of the polity has been fundamentally and irreversibly transformed. The operational, environmental changes have proven problematic for virtually all actors to navigate without difficulty. Islamist movements, for example, have struggled to adjust ideologically or tactically to their new political opportunities. Contending political movements have likewise struggled with the evolution from protest movements to political parties, with several of the bases of their strength during the uprisings becoming flaws in the electoral and institutional political battles that ensued. A range of indigenous reasons, from urban geography to civil-military relations to political economy, provide explanation for the unravelling of the political struggles.

Regional demonstration effects had a potent effect on the prospects and performance of protest movements. Tunisia and Egypt stimulated the public protests as they unexpectedly assumed that they could make it, whereas a year later Syria’s shocks probably dissuaded others from pushing for a revolution that could have evidently led to something worse. The regional impacts were not only incidental demonstration effects. The Arab uprisings have shaped and reintroduced the Arab cold war defined by competitive proxy involvements and new forms of regional association and encounter. Qatar’s attempts at supporting the Muslim Brotherhood’s movements across the region, mediations against the Libyan and Syrian regimes, and the use of Al-Jazeera to form and influence regional public opinion were one of the most apparent of such attempts. The objective behind Saudi Arabia’s moves to back friendly monarchical regimes monetarily, politically, and even militarily (in case of Bahrain) was to protect and consolidate its conventional alliance structure. This continuing rationale of proxy wars and competitive mobilization within states that (possibly for the time being) lack actual domestic control has fashioned the consequences of numerous important waves of popular mobilization in the region’s history. The passion in the early months of 2011 has long since given way to an extended, tenacious political tussle. It is far too soon to propose any decisive deductions about the eventual results of the Arab uprisings. However, absolutism is seldom as steady as it seems during the days of ordinary politics, but likewise seldom as transient as it might appear during revolutionary moments. The undercurrents of the initial days of mass mobilization rarely wholly foresee the consequences of the tough institutional and political battles to follow. Consequently, political scientists need to be equipped to elucidate both those political struggles and those moments when widespread mobilization gushes to overturn the system.

A rupture has occurred in the Arab Middle East that has deeply stirred the totalitarian establishment. It has initiated a new semantic and a new era of combative politics and uprisings. It has also revived academic interest in ground level politics, with a focus on the labour force, masses, societal movements, public space and resistance, the decline of hegemony, the crisis of authority and the part of agency in general, which constitutes a refreshing change from the past obsession with elitist politics. However, it has been contended that the revolutionary moment is still unravelling. Revolutionary moments in contrast to revolutions that instantaneously reverse a society’s social, economic and political arrangement, all within a comparatively short period, will take time and space to create a revolutionary outcome. In the process, they might be abandoned, appropriated, incorporated, entrenched, or face hindrances.

The change from a revolutionary moment to a constitutional moment is replete with uncertainties, pressures, and opposing notions of the political. Despite the unpredictability and risks about democratic change, what has ensued in the Arab world is a defining moment. The agenda of political and economic opportunities had abruptly expanded. It is critical to be aware of the importance of this revolutionary episode in the modern history of the Middle East and the ingenious notions and pronunciations of resistance that devastated the system of dominance, predominantly the popular origins of these uprisings amongst the urban and rural poor. Irrespective of what the consequences will be, this trailblazing moment has spun the wheels of history in an evolving and progressive trajectory.

The distinguishing feature of the uprisings was that the Arabs cutting across national boundaries presented a cohesive front in their disapproval of injustice and political authoritarianism. Taking possession of public space, symbols of liberation from colonial rule, Arabs from dissimilar political persuasions, thoughts, and predispositions ‘performed the nation’ as united citizens, in the pursuit of political liberation and civil and economic empowerment. Within this sparkle, original stories are articulated and new histories of resistance, optimism and resolve are expressed. Notwithstanding significant dissimilarities and specificities of the various uprisings, a uniting strand runs through all of them: a call for dignity, empowerment, political citizenship, social equity and justice, and reclaiming the state from premiers for life, as well as from their relatives and crony capitalists who appropriated it and instead electing representative governments. The distinguishing feature of the all-encompassing popular uprisings in 2011 was the vigorous participation by urban and rural workers and the poor in general. The uprisings were not really consistent and harmonious. There also existed a struggle for control inside the public squares within the protests, most conspicuously between religious conservatives and liberal-leaning groups.

The struggle for domination was not really unanticipated as the institutionalization of multiplicity/diversity and the ‘parliamentarization’ of politics is a long drawn process. The authoritarian governments did their best to extend the gulf and distrust between political groups. The enactment of the nation by the protestors comprised people with diverse philosophies and notions of the political and the social, a wide-ranging alliance whose members may possibly also intensely doubt each other. Therefore, multiplicity cannot be wished away. As such, the test confronting the post-authoritarian order is to institutionalize multiplicity or diversity, institute a far-reaching electoral alliance and re-establish political conviction. The revolutionary moment should not be mistaken with the unfolding consequences and the fierce political and social struggles. Instead of declaring the end of the supposed Arab Spring, experts should stress on interpreting the bases of susceptibilities confronting the evolution in distinct Arab societies and the drivers behind the political ideological encounters between dominant groups.

Ahmed Ezz Eldin, crisply summed up the legacy of the Arab Spring, more than six years from its outbreak in the following words:   

It has been almost five years since the Arab Spring started. Yet, the spring turned into a cold dark winter. Political instability, civil wars, millions of refugees, terrorism, failed states, and more brutal dictatorships are only some of the poor outcomes. The political disappointment of the Arab youth has drawn many of them into supporting extremist ideas and joining terrorist organizations. Dictators are being celebrated as heroes of “liberation and political stability” instead of war criminals. The democracy-enthusiast Western governments have surrendered to the realities of Middle Eastern politics and retained their old strategies of supporting the region’s dictatorships. What is worse, the bloodiness of the outcomes turned the masses towards supporting their dictatorships even more than before. Yet, the picture might not be all that bleak. Tunisia managed to successfully transition to democracy with minor bloodshed. The remaining lesson for the rest of the countries is that the idolization of revolutions might be deceptive. For revolutions to lead to better lives, they have to be undertaken with the complete understanding of the domestic and international political structures. Otherwise, they lead to worse outcomes: civil war and stronger dictatorships. The lesson from the Arab Revolutions is clear; as Louis de Saint-Just put it, ‘those who make revolutions by half do nothing but dig their own graves.’ It might be true that it could be decades before the Arab World revolts again. However, when it happens, the masses have a historical experience to learn from. This might be the only positive legacy of the Arab Spring.

Excerpts from Priya Singh, “Introduction: Reconceptualising West Asia”, in Priya Singh, (Edited) Re-envisaging West Asia: Looking Beyond the Arab Uprisings ) New Delhi: Shipra, 2016.

Priya

9/8/2017

References

Marc Lynch, Introduction in Marc Lynch, (Edited) The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.

Fawaz A. Gerges, (Edited) The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Ahmed Ezz Eldin, “The ending was determined by money and blood relations,” The Tale of the Arab Revolutions- Your Middle East:  http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/the-tale-of-the-arab-revolutions_37950