Kazakhstan 2022: A profile of protest
Posted on : February 7, 2022Author : Suchandana Chatterjee
The image of Kazakhstan as a post-Soviet nation consistently balancing between economic recovery and authoritarian control received a big blow as popular protest erupted in different cities of Kazakhstan in the first week of January 2022. The immediate cause of the protest was government’s decision to control price of liquid petroleum gas (LPG). It is somewhat alarming that the government took such a rash decision in a pandemic situation. Already the living conditions of the common Kazakhs has deteriorated in the last two years. Strict lockdowns during the pandemic severely affected the lives of domestic migrants who moved from the provinces to cities for work. Most of them lost their jobs. In the midst of such distressing socio-economic conditions, an LPG price hike was totally unexpected.
On the government side, different theories were projected to explain the spike—(a) high demand of LPG (b) trade in LPG in the international market carried out electronically which caused a fluctuation in prices and (c) arbitrary price-fixing by gas stations, say around 80 tenge to a litre.
Whatever was the official argument, LPG was the cheapest option for the common people who use their vehicles. The sudden announcement created a stir and people took to the streets in the cold January winter. On 2nd January 2022, Kazakh demonstrators began street demonstrations in Zhanaozen, in the western Mangistau region. Protesters demanded prices to be cut back from 120 tenge per litre to the old price of 60 tenge per litre. Small protests and scuffles with the police took place in other towns in western oil regions where strikes are very common, as in Aktau. Strikes in oilfields in Mangistau region were reported and civil rights activists were detained in Atyrau. Civil rights activism spread to Nursultan, the administrative and commercial capital and Almaty, the cultural capital. The tone of protest changed as people no longer complained about need, but asked for definitive answers to their questions about LPG shortage, which they felt was ignored by the Ministry of Energy.
Within a week, protests expressing solidarity for their brothers in Zhanaozen emerged in other cities like Almaty. This time it was no longer an organic form of protest, but more direct and hard hitting. There were random acts of violence, like robbing of supermarkets, raiding of ATMs, seizing of armoured vehicles, forceful entry into the prosecutor’s office and the National Security Committee building and destruction of TV stations and other media offices. These were examples of a popular outburst, spontaneous in nature, with the probable intention of discrediting the local administration.
For protestors in Almaty, rising prices of LPG was not the only cause of concern. For them, survival had become a lifelong problem, especially for domestic migrants among whom there was a large section of frustrated unemployed youth. They felt betrayed by the ruling elite who only made tall promises of development. So, instead of actual socio-economic issues of protest, people had started protesting against the policies of the regional and local governments. The President-for-life Nursultan Nazarbayev was accused of not only systematically building his own coterie of officials in the government and laying the foundations of dynastic control but also removing strong contenders in power like the security chief Massimov.
Zhanaozen: Grim reminders of the past
Protests in Almaty and Zhanaozen were not entirely apolitical in nature. This is a story of betrayal. For Zhanaozen oil workers who have toiled hard and added to Kazakhstan’s prosperity, with much of that wealth making the elites in the government wealthier, now feel betrayed by the price hike. The 10 year anniversary of the crackdown on Zhanaozen striking oil workers also acted as a catalyst of protest. There was open call for fresh local elections rather than centre-administered nominations. “The people should elect the akims (mayors and governors) of regions and towns. We do not need puppets and shirkers sent from Akorda (the presidential palace),” a Zhanaozen resident said. His words echoed complaints often heard from common people in Kazakhstan who have questioned the accountability of those in power and who neither understand nor care about their problems.
In Almaty, the LPG issue was a pretext for starting a solidarity movement. Here, protests echoed the people’s voice. In a Carnegie Moscow podcast, the discussants pointed out that since 2019, the agenda of protest was different: the people’s demands were different. They were fed up with temporary half-hearted measures of local governors and akims. There was a hue and cry about the crypto currency regimes of Nazarbayev and his ally, Tokayev. The “Old Man Get Out” slogan was clear indicator of the mob mentality. Protest was no more restricted to expressions of dissent. The violence that sprung up on the streets was alarming, changing the basic profile of Almaty as a cultural capital.
Inception
‘The Kazakhstan way’, based on economy first model, had its own pitfalls. This model generated a feeling of social injustice as various segments of the population became more and more aware of the discrepancy between the availability of natural resources and the income generated by their sale which also affected the standard of living of the majority of the population. It was only a matter of time when popular dissatisfaction would translate into open protest.
Open protest took place in 2011, in the oil town Zhanaozen in Mangistau region. Workers in the oil producing regions of Western Kazakhstan feel excluded from the economic prosperity of the country’s major urban centres, such as the cities Almaty and Astana. While workers in the Mangistau region produce close to 70% of the country’s oil output, they live and work in difficult conditions with many households lacking basic services.
Here, there were considerable socioeconomic problems. Predominantly ethnically Kazakh, its population more than doubled from 2000 to 2010 to more than 125,000, due to the oil boom that attracted the influx of better paid foreign workers and of migrants (mostly ethnic Kazakhs that have lived abroad, the oralman). However, Zhanaozen and the Mangistau region offer few opportunities: the economy is heavily dominated by oil production, which does not create many jobs. Most goods have to be imported at high prices, as the small business sector is underdeveloped. As a result, unemployment is high. The disparity of pay packets among foreign and local specialists is a source of tension in the Kazakh oil and gas industry. The tension between indigenous population and ethnic repatriates or returnees (oralman) have increased over time. Among the striking oil workers at Zhanaozen approximately a quarter were oralmany.
What began as a workers’ strike by thousands of oil workers in three companies soon transformed into violent outbursts from both sides. The workers demanded higher take-home pay along with equal rights with foreign workers and the lifting of restrictions on the indigenous labour union groupings in the region.
Employees involved in the protest were dismissed. After their dismissal, a large group of workers set up a tent city in Zhanaozen’s central square. From there, they kept up their protest, demanding reemployment and a review of their salaries. The federal government intervened to negotiate a compromise solution that included alternative jobs in a railroad project. But all that was turned down.
A full scale conflict ensued on 16 December 2011 which was the Independence Day of post-Soviet Kazakhstan. In Zhanaozen’s central square, where hundreds of protesters had set up their tents for more than six months, at least 16 people were killed and more than 100 people were injured when the police started shooting in order to clear the square for official celebrations on Independence Day. The protesters went berserk, pelting stones and smashing equipment on stage brought for the celebrations.
President Nazarbayev imposed a 20-day state of emergency and a curfew in Zhanaozen. Official claims about restoration of normalcy were questionable. Oil workers gathered outside the mayor’s office in Aktau to show solidarity with those workers killed in Zhanaozen. Riot police confronted them, cordoning off the area to keep the protesters at bay. By 21 December, the solidarity groupings fizzled out.
State and society
The mood of despair became evident in the first decade since independence as the Kazakh President was busy hobnobbing with partners in the oil and gas sectors, negotiating with them through bilateral treaties and strengthening its position in the Caspian region while taking advantage of the presence of Western oil companies. In the 2000s, there was a shift in approach as Kazakhstan moved away from balancing strategy with her oil partners into an overt tactics of ‘clan balancing’ in which personal loyalty and clan affiliation mattered the most. In the third phase, Nazarbayev moved towards the goal of securing his position as President for life. He sought to support not only ethnic Kazakh business groups from his own clan, but also influential business groups who were non-Kazakh but supported his vision of a Eurasian Union. This boosted the prestige of the office of the Kazakh President and raised expectations about multilateralism as a guideline in foreign policy.
The post-Nazarbayev regime of Tokayev struck a discordant note. A career diplomat, Tokayev was more reliant about internal order governed by allies like Russia and dominant groupings like CSTO. Instead of relying on his own silovniki or servicemen in the security services to deal with the public protest, Tokayev called for CSTO intervention to forcibly combat what he called the terrorist upsurge. Peacekeeping forces from Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan and Armenia started arriving in Kazakhstan within three days of the protest demonstrations. Policy experts view this action as a clear motive of crackdown on its own people rather than an internal reform which could have somewhat eased the tension.
In each and every phase, the discourse of protest revolved round the issue of betrayal by Kazakh authorities. In their projection of “enemies of the state”, the official discourse hints at conspiracies, i.e. the demonstrations were staged not directly by the oilmen but engineered by external forces: oralmany and dissatisfied elite groups. Chaos and anarchy ensued; management of socio-economic issues took a backseat and the state and society locked horns and bargaining methods that could help improve the situation failed.
As regards other nationalities who lived and worked in those troubled parts of the country were concerned, a great deal of uncertainty prevailed about how to escape from the infiltrating troops and return to their homes or places of refuge. Such was the case of a young Manipuri student of a Korean university who, like other foreign travellers was left stranded in Almaty airport, because the CSTO troops had entered Almaty and the Kazakh President had given shoot-at-sight orders if any suspicious movement was noticed. The Indian mission in Kazakhstan however, worked hard on the rescue mission.
Conclusions
The unrest in Kazakhstan subsided within the third week of January. Urgent measures like energy and food prices have been capped. Business is likely to be more people-friendly. The present regime of Tokayev is trying to steer clear of the blame for the crisis that engulfed several regions. His predecessor, Nazarbayev has his own share of blame for the impasse that could only be resolved with intervention from CSTO, which itself is an embarrassment for the country that once boasted of ‘the Kazakhstan way’. Challenges are far from over. Instead of showing off their oil and gas assets, the present regime will have to focus on improving its profile as a good keeper of assets and good manager of state-society relations or will have to face the aggression of the public.
Suchandana Chatterjee
The author is associated with research in Central Asian and Eurasian studies. Her doctoral thesis (Department of History, University of Calcutta, 2002) is entitled Emirate of Bukhara, 1868-1924: Encounters with Transition. During 1993-2015, she was Research Associate and Fellow at Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata. During 2016-2019, she was Senior Academic Fellow, Indian Council of Historical Research, Delhi. Her research interests include shared spaces, connected histories and shifting identities of Eurasia. Her publications include books, book chapters and articles in seminar proceedings, edited volumes on Central Asia, Eurasia and Buddhism in Asia. She is based in Kolkata and may be contacted at suchandana2008@gmail.com.
References
Sourav Roy Burman, ‘Caught in Kazakh unrest with no word on return, Indians say get us home’, The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 13, 2022.
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