Indo Russian Relations

This year marks that 50th anniversary of the branch of mathematics known as chaos theory. Edward Lorenz, an MIT mathematician was working on an early computer weather modeling simulation in 1961, and in an effort to save time waiting for his vacuum tube-powered computer to run the program, started his simulation from the middle, manually entering in data from an earlier simulation, but crucially, rounding a six decimal point number to three decimal points in order to save space. What Lorenz found after returning from a coffee break was that these tiny, seemingly arbitrary changes in his initial inputs had led to vastly different outcomes in the weather models he created. But Lorenz saw more than randomness embedded in his weather model. He saw a fine geometrical structure, “order veiled as randomness.” Chaos is the study of nonlinear systems – those in which outputs are not necessarily proportional to inputs and has been highly influential in fields ranging from physics, to engineering, to astronomy, agriculture to economics. But chaos also had applications in some less obvious areas, such as politics and international relations. In fact, the ideas behind chaos are far more intuitive in the study of politics and armed conflict than in the natural sciences where it originated. What follows is a reflection on Indo Russian relations in terms of what chaos theory would argue as ‘order concealed in randomness’.

There was in fact nothing inevitable about the turn that India’s relations took with Russia in the immediate post-independence era. It was on the one hand economic and technical assistance that Moscow extended to Delhi and on the other the fact that US and UK roped Pakistan into the Baghdad and Manila Pacts that led India to align with Soviet positions on international diplomatic matters. After some initial Russian defense purchases in the late 1950s, India agreed to buy MiG-21 aircraft in 1961, facilitated by technology transfers and mindful of deterring China. Relations assumed a clearer direction with the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which was prompted by the US-China reconciliation and their support for Pakistan. As a consequence, India’s defense ties with the USSR deepened and by the early 1990s, the Soviet Union was India’s largest trade partner. It was also Russia’s repeated veto against the Anglo American tilt towards Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute that led to the foundation of Delhi’s enduring faith in Moscow. And till recently it was Russia alone that made an unambiguous choice between India and Pakistan in favour of the former. This relationship was formalized through India’s military relationship with Russia that developed over the decades and the rupee rouble trade that concretized it. But what bound India and Russia together was also the need to construct a regional balance of power system in Southern Asia during the second half of the 20th century.

In the changed context of the 21st century with possibilities of American retrenchment, the rise of China and its power projection into regions as far as the South Pacific, Africa and the Mediterranean, the broadening of relations between Moscow and Beijing, the breakdown of the relations between Moscow and the EU, emerging trade wars on the one hand and new economic partnerships on the other and India’s own pursuit of connects towards Eurasia as well as the Indo Pacific, a recalibration of ties with Russia has been unfolding. The relationship in recent times had become overwhelmingly dependent on the sale and in recent times joint production and weapons systems. The only other area of cooperation that has reflected the ‘special and privileged’ nature of the relationship is nuclear energy. Beyond this, the trade and investment relationship is virtually non-existent. Even in natural gas and oil, where flourishing trade should have existed given Russia’s abundant supply and India’s growing demand, very little exists beyond a few Indian investments in Russian oil and gas companies and fields. The deals signed last year, if they come to fruition, could however boost mutual investments in this sector. So the relationship has become one dimensional and largely transactional.

Also China’s rise has prompted a realigning of relations between Moscow and New Delhi and while Russia has been having the best phase of its relationship with China, India’s has moved in the opposite direction. Strong economic, diplomatic, and increasing military support from China to Pakistan is an irritant for India and India is unhappy about CPEC. India and China also have a long and disputed border in the Himalayas. A standoff in the border region between the two countries last summer threatened to blow into a military showdown but that disaster scenario was averted. Nevertheless, hostile rhetoric by Beijing during the dispute is seen as increasing assertiveness and China’s newfound power and stature in world affairs. India is furthermore wary of Chinese moves around its neighborhood, primarily Beijing’s use of its economic power. This growing strength of China and increasing Russian reliance on Beijing has meant that New Delhi is looking for allies elsewhere. And here ties with Japan, France and US are significant. Recently Australia joined the three countries in a much publicized quadrilateral grouping. The objective of the so-called Quad is to cooperate in exercising and increasing influence of the four powers across Asia, from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The developing larger geostrategic picture in Asia today therefore pits land powers, Russia and China, against maritime powers.

Under these circumstances, what explains India’s high-profile and sustained engagement with Russia this year? One, India still needs Russia for military spare parts just as Moscow needs New Delhi for revenue. Two, there are certain technologies that Russia is willing to provide — such as nuclear-powered submarines — that the likes of the United States never will. The defense relationship will therefore remain vital for the foreseeable future. Three, as in years past, Russia wields a powerful veto at the UN Security Council, and multilateral cooperation extends to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Four, there are deep and abiding concerns in New Delhi about Russia’s post-2014 relationship with China and its exploratory ties with Pakistan. For all these reasons, engaging with Russia at the highest levels is absolutely necessary. Major deals — including last year’s multi-billion dollar deal involving Rosneft and Essar or this year’s negotiations towards the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system — are likely to continue, even if they risk attracting the ire of Europe and the United States. India and Russia, to their credit, have been trying to increase their bilateral trade for the last two decades in order to develop a more positive relationship, though here they have achieved only partial success. One-way movement of armaments continues to be the major component of economic activity. India is the biggest market of foreign arms in the world; Russia has traditionally been among its largest suppliers. However, in recent times this seems to be changing and India has increasingly looked to the United States and Israel for weapons. In geostrategic terms, an India-Russia split would harden the periphery versus core competition that is taking shape. Trump’s pressure on Pakistan at a time Russia is inviting it in with open arms could also lead to a change in its outlook. While India would be locked out of Central Asia, Russia would also end up becoming even more dependent on China. It is tough to say which state may end up with the worse of the bargain.

One way to energize the relationship is to direct their attention towards collaboration in new and emerging technologies. Both India and Russia have made significant advancements in sunrise sectors, and offer unique advantages for each other. There are four broad areas where the two countries can join forces. First is the field of quantum computing. Quantum computing, which uses subatomic particles for computing instead of standard binary bits, is poised to be the next great technological leap. The possibilities of this technology for everything from space travel to medical research are staggering, and have created an inevitable race to develop the first industrial quantum computer. Russia has been making a concerted effort to pioneer quantum computing, primarily through the Russian Quantum Centre. Significant collaboration in this sector will allow India access to the cutting-edge infrastructure necessary to indigenously develop this technology while providing Russia with ready market access for any quantum technologies it may develop in the future. Second, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics present a unique opportunity for joint action. Russia, has made great strides in the militarization of AI and robotics and in allied fields like drone warfare, which could be immensely beneficial for India. While high-tech defense collaboration between India and Russia has focused thus far on conventional weapons like fighter planes and missiles, a greater emphasis on AI and robotics will help extend the military relationship into the future. The third avenue wherein both nations can work together is cybersecurity. While this may be a controversial suggestion in the light of recent events, from a purely strategic point of view, India has much to learn from the Russian experience. The two countries have recently signed an agreement which establishes a high-level dialogue on cyber issues and provides for cooperation, coordination and exchange of information on counter-terrorism. The final arena of partnership is traditional information technology (IT) and software, including and especially Big Data. With the US, UK, Singapore and Australia now closing their doors to Indian IT workers, it becomes imperative for India to find alternative avenues that can absorb its technology workforce. Russia’s highly developed IT infrastructure is facing an increasing shortage of skilled labour. Indian IT talent is well placed to take advantage of this shortfall. Russia could also be an outlet for Indian IT investment, given that its location provides ready access to the untapped markets of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Each of the four areas listed above require only the most basic government intervention. If a credible bilateral trade framework for these sectors can be put in place, there is enough momentum for market forces to drive collaboration.

India’s high-profile and sustained outreach to Moscow in 2018 is therefore not a reversion to an imagined past. It is an attempt at managing a transactional relationship over the medium-term future to secure vital Indian security interests and preserve a favourable balance of power or as chaos theory would suggest take decisions not with long term trajectories in view but with short term advantages.

Anita

7/10/2018