Hamas Attack and Great Power Politics
Posted on : October 16, 2023Author : Ratnadeep Maitra
In his seminal work “The Wretched of Earth”, Frantz Fanon had famously posited that “…violence is cathartic in a sense that it allows them (the colonized) to restore the sense of self destroyed by colonialism”. Fanon maintained that the protracted form of colonial subjugation, degenerated the colonized “self” into an “animal”, and it was a truism that their grammar of protest would be violent. In the wake of the current Israel-Palestine flareup, the strategic circuit in Tel-Aviv had instructively maintained that, “…(the) quality of a military is mainly decided by the quality of the enemy”.
The essay contends that the two aforementioned positions substantively capture the two irreconcilable standpoints in the extant polarized geopolitical discourse, contingent on the ideological inclinations of the viewer. However, the recurrent virtue signaling emanating from both sides of the divide, glosses over certain dimensions of violence, justice and agency, which the essay seeks to retrieve. While steering clear of any polemic, it strives to problematize the crisis and locate it geopolitically.
For the sake of convenience, the current conflict has been theoretically categorized, to involve the key stakeholders – primary agent (Hamas), immediate victims (Israeli civilians), reactive agents (Israel) and long-term victims (Gaza civilians).
The temporality of operation Toofan Al-Aqsa that was launched by Hamas coincided with the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The “rockets as resistance”, as it was contentiously deemed by much of the global civil society, ruptured an incipient “New Middle-East” formulation – a shorthand for the Arab-Israeli thaw following the Abraham Accords, the Arab-Iranian détente under a Chinese mediation, as well as potential long-term geo-economic cooperation in an otherwise volatile space. Thus, the operation was also against a certain downgrading of the Palestinian problem, in the hierarchy of Middle-Eastern priorities. The operation equally dismantled any modus vivendi between Israel and Hamas.
It is imperative to capture two dissimilarities between Toofan Al-Aqsa and the Yom Kippur War – specificity of motivations and potential effects. While Anwar Sadat, the then Egyptian President had a well-structured calculus to militarily defeat Israel, (with minimal involvement of civilian population) the Hamas attack was extremely incoherent in terms of immediate and long-term motivations. Moreover, the strategic heft and military might in the current conflict seems greatly lopsided in favor of Israel, unlike during the Yom Kippur War, where its very right to exist was in jeopardy. Equally important, a third difference might be fleshed out – nature of fallacy. While the war was an erroneous outcome of certain key power-holders, it was the systemic collapse of the defence and intelligence agencies which culminated in the current crisis.
The systemic failure might be correlated to the innenpolitik of Israel. The media conduits as Haaretz had described the present Netanyuhu government as one of “annexation and dispossession”. In a quest to retain his stronghold over power, Bibi had struck a compromise with the far-right parties in Israel, many of whom were opposed to the “two-state solution”. Moreover, there were ongoing popular protests, against a fuzzy judicial reform, which effectively diluted the power of the judicial structure. The domestic turmoil was further compounded by ultra-conservatives as Ben Gvir’s visit to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, which was deemed to be provocative to a significant demography.
It would be misleading to theorize the indiscriminate usage of violence by Hamas, especially against women and children (immediate victims), as any form of “collective catharsis” – wherein a conduit through which “force accumulated in the form of aggression can be released”. In other words, the Palestinian “self” does not liberate itself through this act, but remains “colonized” by cyclical violence – wherein a disproportionate Israeli retaliation provides the exact cannon fodder for subsequent Hamas-led mobilizations and operations.
The deeply graphic nature of atrocities by Hamas seems to provide a violent spectacle to the war crimes especially against women – keeping the collective psyche in a perpetual state of fear. Scholarship has maintained that sexual violence during war, augments group solidarity, endowing the male combatant with a certain “psychological backup” to their disturbing “performance”. In this context, the sexual violence against “enemy” women serves a “communicative function” as well, for the female body is representative of the ethnic group and “body politic” in question, and exerting power over her “body”, is seen as tantamount to exerting domination over the “enemy” territory.
At this point, it is critical to examine Hamas (primary agent) more closely. It has been categorized by defense commentators as a “quasi-military” formation, reminiscent of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and its guerilla stratagem. While its provenance can be traced back to the First Intifada, it provided a robust alternative vis-à-vis the “secular nationalists” of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
The watershed elections of 2006, marked the coming-of-age moment for Hamas, as it secured a strong mandate. The emergence of Hamas, whose charter explicitly states its readiness in “…resisting the occupation with all means and methods…” – a euphemism for de-prioritizing constitutional mechanisms – corresponds with a greater Palestinian propensity for violence, especially amongst its youth. While scholarship has captured, how the Hamas charter gives a clarion call to destroy the state of Israel, yet the Palestinian position on Hamas to be the “most deserving of representation and leading the Palestinian people” might be read as their reoriented subjectivity – the right to self-determination of the “self” to be contingent on eliminating the right of the “other” to exist. The strategic design of Hamas could be read as a weaponization of passion to undertake crimes of premeditation.
Before scrutinizing the reactive agent (Israel) and the long-term victims (Gaza civilians), it is worthwhile to locate the responses of the major powers in the global order. While Washington was quick to proclaim the legitimate right of Israel to “defend itself”, assuring a “rock-solid” support, but sustaining a bipartisan consensus for an Israeli military retaliation would remain challenging, given the positions of “measured” responses and “self-restraint” taken by the leaders as Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez within the Democrats.
Interestingly, Beijing has eschewed any definite position, and in a rather mealy-mouthed manner asked for “each party’s legitimate concerns to be respected”. The Chinese reluctance to condemn Hamas, becomes clearer when contraposed with the position of Antonio Guiterres. While the latter was “deeply troubled” by Israel’s blockade of Gaza, he categorically noted how the “killing, looting and maiming of civilians” was indefensible.
The Middle-Eastern theatre remained an eventful geopolitical space, as Israel’s “aura of invisibility” got shattered. With nations as Turkey and Qatar deeming Netanyuhu to be culpable for the crisis, the militant non-state actors operating in the region as Arab Militias, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah or Houthis might get a fresh lease of legitimacy, for their next operation. Of particular importance, is the question of Iran. Counter-terrorism analysts have long noted how Hamas and Hezbollah, have been receiving extensive patronage from the Iranian regime. Despite different loyalties in the Syrian civil war, the burgeoning collaboration between Hamas and Hezbollah is reflective of the larger expansionist ambitions of Iran.
Finally, the Indian position needs to be looked at more closely, given two contrasting positions within the two major political parties – the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party and the Indian National Congress in the opposition. It must be stated however that, as per the recent statement of the ministry of external affairs, there has been a recognition for “establishing a sovereign, independent, and viable state of Palestine…side by side at peace with Israel”.
But this essay revisits the first tweet of Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the ongoing crisis and the subsequent statement of the Congress Working Committee. Narendra Modi’s tweet had showcased an unambiguous solidarity with Israel amidst “terrorist attacks”, while the CWC reiterated the “long-standing rights of the Palestinian people to land, self-government and to live with dignity and respect” with no mention of the Hamas attack. While strategic commentators earmarked the former tweet as emblematic of a “de-linking of religion from regional diplomacy” and the latter statement as catering to the domestic Muslim demography, the essay contends, that the two positions exhibit a remarkable degree of historic continuity.
The Congress position is simply a vindication of its long-held commitment, stemming from its October Resolution of 1937, which “…assures the Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian People with them in their struggle for national freedom”. No less than Gandhi, in one of his articles in Harijan articulated, “…Palestine belongs to Arabs in the same sense, that England belongs to the English, or France to the French”.
On the other hand, Jana Sangh – the political predecessor of the ruling party – had long perceived Israel not as geographical marker but as the crystallization of the Jewish restoration of motherland, and an epitome of “sacred nationalism”. A 1967 article in the Organizer submitted that unlike Muslims, the Hindu and the Jews were not under the “benumbing control of a rigid theology and petrified dogma”, but rather possessed an “eclectic” bent of mind, accommodative to the “other” point of view. The Jana Sangh held the Arabs responsible for “acts of aggression” towards the “distinctive” Jewish tradition.
From a geo-strategic standpoint, India must be prepared for fluctuations in oil price and temporary setbacks to the India-Middle-East-Europe-Economic Corridor.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the crisis is far from over. The response from Israel (reactive agent) has the potency to unleash an unprecedented level of damage to the Gaza civilians (long-term victims) to the extent outdoing the infamous Nakba – the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Reports have suggested that more than two thousand Gaza civilians have already been killed in the skirmish.
The current discourse in Israel has tended to view the Gaza citizens in inhuman terms – “human animals” – which can dangerously legitimize a logic of collective punishment for the entire Gaza populace – most of whom happen to be descendants of refugees. Given their infamous strategy of “mowing the lawn”, coupled with their new-age military capacities, it is futile to expect Israel to abide by every war-time convention. One may already find traces of such violations with the cutting off, of food, water and electricity supplies to Gaza, in addition to releasing white phosphorous in densely populated civilian pockets – a complete contravention of international humanitarian laws.
The response from Israel has bordered around a sense of retributive justice, wherein their violence might gradually become disproportionate to the savagery of the crime committed in the first place, greatly undermining Israel’s credibility as the “injured party” in this crisis.
Regarding the pre-modern barbaric mode of punishment and physical torture, to right a profound wrong, Foucault had adroitly pointed out, “…the murder that is depicted as a horrible crime, is repeated in cold blood, remorselessly”. Hopefully, Israel does not turn into the very Frankenstein, it is fighting.
References
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(https://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/01/20/fanon-on-violence-and-the-person/)
- Alison, Miranda (2007). Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity. Review of International Studies, 33(1), 75-90.
- Gordon, Leonard (1975). Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel. Jewish Social Studies, 37(3/4), 221-234.
- Bar-Joseph, Uri (2023, October 8). This Is What Made the Attack on Israel Possible, Haaretz.
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(https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/10/the-hamas-attack-changes-everything/)
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(https://www.orfonline.org/research/israel-hamas-war/)
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(https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/hamas-attack-snarls-up-us-choices-in-west-asia/)
Ratnadeep Maitra
Adjunct Researcher Asia in Global Affairs
Disclaimer: The originality of the content and the opinions expressed within the content are solely the author’s and do not reflect the position of the organization
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