Decoding the Ukraine Imbroglio and the Indian Dilemma

Ever since the last couple of weeks news headlines have been filled with the uncanny situation in Ukraine. The Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it amply clear that he does not want a conflict with Ukraine. However, he has put the rider of security guarantees from the West that Ukraine will not be admitted as a member of the NATO. Coupled with this he also wants to seek an assurance concerning the eastward expansion of the NATO. A silver lining which emerged in the form of a meeting between US and Russian representatives in Geneva failed to offer any clear roadmap. It is in this backdrop that Russia has amassed about 100,000 troops coupled with tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers at the border with Ukraine stoking fears of an ensuing invasion. Apart from demanding that the NATO deny membership to Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics Russia has also sought assurance that the former rolls back its military deployments in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of these demands have been deemed ‘unacceptable’ by the US.
Russia has time and again brought up this issue of Ukrainian membership as a ‘red line’ which it deems as a hostile act towards Moscow by bringing a US-led military alliance right up to its doorstep. In the weeks that led up to the NATO summit in 2008 Russia had voiced similar concerns. In the months following the summit Russia went to war with Georgia which amply attests to Putin’s steely resolve to secure what he considers Russia’s genuine interests. The history of the Cold War era is instructive in this regard as the then USSR considered Eastern Europe as its extended sphere of influence which could act as a credible deterrent or a strategic buffer against the West. We must also remember that during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Khrushchev also sought an assurance from Kennedy that the NATO must remove its missile installations from Turkey which have the capability to hit every major city in Western Russia within a very short interval. This also comprises one of the current demands as well.
Recently during the Afghan crisis Russia’s strategic omnipotence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was in full display when the Five Stans were seeking security assurances from Russia to avoid a spill over of hostilities to their respective territories. While Central Asia has remained firmly in its grip apart from Belarus all the Baltic republics and Russia’s erstwhile East European allies have steadily moved out of the ambit of their Big Brother. The present series of events also appears to be a culmination of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia following the removal of a pro-Russia Ukrainian leader. In the recent weeks Russia has also resorted to the strategy of making advances to various lesser known politicians and unlikely leaders in Ukraine to use them at a later stage. The domestic mood in the US itself is very discordant after the debacle in Afghanistan which has been further compounded by Biden’s statement that he is mulling to send a limited number of American troops to Ukraine if the situation so demands. Trump Republicans on the other hand are echoing the strategic concerns of Russia in a certain way while claiming that China not Russia represents the real challenge for the US.
Ukraine and Russia also boast of a strong political, economic and cultural bond with each other with Putin often hailing the former as ‘Little Russia’ and talking about the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Kiev (Kievan Rus) was also the birthplace of the first Russian state in the 9th century. When Ukraine was getting engulfed in the anti-Russian and pro-EU Orange Revolution in 2005 Putin also lamented for the tens of millions of his fellow citizens who found themselves on the fringes of Russian territory while holding the breakup of the erstwhile USSR as a tragedy for all Russians. Demographic imperatives have also been a consistent determinant with at least one-third of the Ukrainian population who reside on the eastern part of the country speaking Russian. It is this Russian-speaking population in the east which has always favoured greater integration with Russia while the Ukrainian-speaking population in the west has supported closer ties with the EU.
What is the position of India then in this emerging conflict? It must be remembered that the US and India share a comprehensive, global strategic partnership which is driven by their shared democratic values. It covers almost all areas of human endeavour and sees both the nations converging on a host of issues. With Russia on the other hand India shares a longstanding and privileged strategic partnership. On 27th March, 2014 when the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 was adopted in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea India along with 57 nations had abstained from voting. According to certain commentators since the US and Russia are both valued partners it would not seem judicious to take sides in the current contestation as well.
India must also be mindful that it cannot support the coercive and military occupation of a country’s territory by another. This is equally true in case of the declaration of independence of any country acting as a break-away unit with the military support of another country. In this context the illegal demands of China with regards to Indian Territory in Ladakh as well as Arunachal Pradesh must be kept in mind. On the western front Kashmir continues to be a legacy issue with India especially sceptical of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which passes through the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). It is instructive to note that following the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 India did not formally recognize the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Caucasus taken over by Russia. Similarly India has also not recognized Kosovo ever since it declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 despite the US having stood firmly behind Kosovo ever since its separation from Serbia. There is also apprehension among certain quarters that if India takes a neutral stand on this issue then it will strengthen the hand of China which has consistently endorsed Russia’s position ever since the contestation took shape. In light of the ongoing standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which has seen large scale troop mobilization on either side India will be wary of raising Moscow’s ire when it is dependent on Russian military supplies. It must be remembered that in 1962 when Moscow sought Beijing’s support during the Cuban Missile Crisis it was reciprocated in the form of Soviet support for ally China during a crucial juncture in the Indo-China War.
The current crisis also has the potential to cause major trouble for India’s efforts to deepen security and economic ties with its American and European partners in the Indo-Pacific. According to certain commentators this impasse might shift the US attention as Afghanistan and Middle East crises did in the previous administrations. In order to face the Russian challenge the European capitals might want to stabilize ties with China which could present itself as a resourceful interlocutor between the West and Moscow. It can seek a compromise with the West which wants stability in Asia to focus on Europe and can deepen the cleavages between the US and Europe. The latter came to the fore when Germany which is dependent on Russia for its energy needs refused to export arms to help Ukraine. A worsening situation will also hinder India’s efforts to diversify its relationship with Russia because of the impending sanctions regime. It must be borne in mind that this contestation is taking shape when Washington is considering a waiver for India under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions (CAATSA) federal law for its purchase of the S400 air defence system from Russia. India also has economic and defense trade ties with Ukraine with 7,500 Indian citizens residing therein which further complicates the situation for New Delhi.
In conclusion we can say while considering the above arguments that India will definitely aspire for a diplomatic solution to the impending conflict while remaining hopeful that Russia does not take any military action against Ukraine. The US in turn can provide Ukraine with the necessary military support and hardware by which it could resist a possible Russian offensive instead of making it a NATO member. The message should be clear that a similar action akin to the 2014 annexation of Crimea will trigger an appropriate response from Ukraine’s allies. Nevertheless, it remains to be said that India will have to prepare for the potential fallout in its relations with the West, Russia and China emerging out of this current impasse.
Debayan Ghatak

The author has interned with Asia in Global Affairs.

References
Ashok Sajjanhar, “How India can tread a diplomatic fine line on the Ukraine crisis between Russia and the West,” Firstpost, December 29, 2021, https://www.firstpost.com/india/how-india-can-tread-a-diplomatic-fine-line-on-the-ukraine-crisis-between-russia-and-the-west-10243291.html
Tanvi Madan, “Why India needs to pay attention Russian military build-up in Ukraine,” The Indian Express, January 22, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/russia-military-build-up-ukraine-india-7734303/