Crystal-gazing India-China Clash amidst their Nuclear Fog
Posted on : July 28, 2020Author : Silky Kaur
With the advent of nuclear weapons, modes and methods of warfare have changed forever. This is one element that has been missing from the heated debates on intensifying India-China border clashes and their implications. It is commonplace today that the presence of nuclear weapons alters power dynamics by reducing the role of superiority in conventional weapons. Indeed, in a globalized world, “changes in policy, posture, and the number of nuclear weapons in one country can have global ramifications” (China Power Team 2020).[1] This may sound like exaggeration. However as E. P. Thompson (1981) argued, “It has never been true that nuclear war is ‘unthinkable’. It has been thought and the thought has been put into effect”.[2] For instance, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was a calculated, deliberate destruction. In this second nuclear age, since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, nuclear scenarios have become only more intricate and tangled. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2020, the key finding of 2019 was that, “all nuclear weapon-possessing states continue to modernize their nuclear arsenal”.[3] Where do India and China stand in these trends?
Nuclear Equation of India and China
Due to the strong economic ties between both nations, their relationship is perceived to be fundamentally different. Masahiro Kurita (2018) argues that, from a nuclear security perspective, China and India have their own complex web of nuclear threats, disputed borders,[4] which is combined with “China and India’s deliberately opaque strategic postures which make objective assessment difficult” (O’Donnell and Bollfrass 2020).[5] They stand today at the edge of “security trilemma” which is unique for it involves a triangle (not dyad) of China, India and Pakistan in which “action taken by one state to protect itself from a second makes a third feel insecure”(Koblentz 2014).[6]
Changing Reality of India China Relations
It is important to note that the violent standoff in Galwan Valley on 15th June was preceded by a series of encounters that had started around 5 May 2020, when both India and China deployed additional troops in “more sectors along the unresolved border in eastern Ladakh” (Times of India, 19 May 2020).[7] Face-off at almost four locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) namely at Pangong lake in Ladakh, Naku La in Sikkim, Galwan valley and Demchok led to intensification of crisis (Krishnan 24 May 2020).[8] On Line of Actual Control (LAC) there are places where claims overlaps (Joshi 2018).[9] This Galwan Valley stand-off though is fast chaining those past dynamics of relations between India and China.
Swaran Singh (2020) has underlined this fact to show how causalities of both India and China in their recent “violent face-off” have forever “altered the era of merely maintaining peace and tranquility on the disputed boundary”. The old ways of maintaining “peace and tranquility” that began in 1988 have now altered forever. The last forty years have witnessed a “complete transformation” of both countries’ “power profile” and produced newer challenges. In their increasing global stature, any bilateral issue between them is increasingly perceived by them from the point of “their increasing regional and global interactions and initiatives”.[10] Bruce Riedel (2020) likewise analyses this situation as, “two states armed with nuclear weapons had a fist fight, with fatal consequences and an unpredictable outcome”.[11]
Given their complex nuclear scenario, last four decades have also seen India and China investing in building peace through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). This has seen increasing people to people interactions as also improved trade and commerce making China the source for India’s largest volume of imports and an influential investor in e-commerce platforms and startups. But security issues have lingered on, as revealed by Ahlawat and Hughes (2018) showing how India-China “bilateral trade interests converged while security interests diverged”.[12] So the CBMs, Joint military exercises, counter-terror drills, annual defence dialogue,[13] none of these have helped in the current tensions[14] and the “Chinese pressure on LAC remained constant”.[15] Swaran Singh (2020) notes “the methods and mechanism for ensuring peace and tranquility have become dated and ineffective”. Does this mean that Galwan Valley like violent face-offs is likely to continue in coming times?
Circumstances that led to Face-off
These tensions happened also because of “changing dynamics along the LAC” (Krishnan 2020). Both India, and more so China, has been trying to modernize their infrastructure on the LAC. India’s construction of roads in the region is seen as a strategic challenge by China (Chandorkar 2020).[16] India and China have had widely “overlapping claims” along LAC (Krishnan 2020). And there has also been increased prosperity on both sides leading to deployment of “better infrastructure and better equipment and smarter weapon systems” which has led to far more “rigorous” patrolling at the LAC. Therefore the “frequency of ingressions, encounters and fistfights” has increased (Singh 2020). Ashok Kantha, former ambassador to China, also stated that though face-off between troops does occur but the recent increase in intensity of face off is due to “increased patrolling” on both sides (Haidar 2020).[17] Chinese troops aggression and increased numbers combined with flouting of “agreed protocols” on the border is the new addition to previous conditions (Haidar 2020). Chinese troops are today present on a “number of points” that were “previously uncontested” such as “Galwan river valley, the ‘Finger’ areas of Pangong Tso and Demchok, as well as Naku la Pass in Sikkim, more than 1,200 kms away from the Line of Actual Control” (Haider 2020).
It is also speculated that India’s scrapping of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and India re-issuing territorial maps of its two Union Territories had irked China.[18] China is also concerned over “India’s engagement with the U.S.- led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue which has perhaps influenced the long-drawn China-India negotiations for disengagement in the Galwan Valley far more directly” (Singh 2020). Dalbir Ahlawat and Lindsay Hughes (2018) show how as these two civilizations are rising simultaneously, “China’s offensive realism negates its ability to acknowledge India as a rising power in its own right”. Because of this orientation of China, India perhaps opted for “defensive realism” and entered into “partnerships, with the US, Japan, Australia and other significant regional countries” (Ahlawat and Hughes 2018). But unlike the U.S., India continues to emphasize on exploring inclusive and non-militarized solutions and in engaging Beijing as well and their nuclear equations perhaps best explain their continued military restraint and dialogue in redressing these violent face-offs.
China’s Nuclear Posture and Capability
According to SIPRI 2020 Yearbook, “China is in the middle of a significant modernization of its nuclear arsenal, with 320 nuclear warheads with capability to be delivered by air, sea and land”. China has developed this nuclear triad that makes its nuclear deterrence robust and credible even against the United States (SIPRI Yearbook 2020). Does this mean that “Beijing’s primarily defensive nuclear strategy may also be revised” soon (China Power Team 2020)? This will surely complicate matters especially for its neighbours.
Traditionally, the nuclear posture of China had been aimed at maintaining “minimum deterrence” with “credible second-strike capability” and has maintained “low alert level” for its nuclear forces (Kristensen and Korda 2019).[19] But recent times have seen it evolving more assertive templates. The 2006 Defense White Paper of China, for instance, states that China maintains “self-defensive nuclear strategy”, deterrence through “assured retaliation” with a defensive posture of “no first use (NFU)” policy. China’s “official NFU policy is unconditional” yet many strategists have expressed doubts over China’s commitment to its NFU policy (China Power Team 2020).
Another concern is that China’s nuclear modernization program has been focused on “developing strategic early warning systems”, which raises questions about its future adoption of a “launch-on warning”[20] posture, which will surely undermine China’s policy of no-first use ( US Defense Department 2019) . Moreover, “Chinese officials privately say that China would respond with nuclear weapons if its nuclear forces were attacked with conventional weapons” (Kristensen and Korda 2019). China’s “nuclear weapons modernization program” remains in competition with the U.S. and this will further enhance its “nuclear posture to ensure credibility of its retaliatory strike force” (Kristensen and Korda 2019). China has also promoted nuclear proliferation across Asia through transfer of materials and technology to North Korea and Pakistan for its policy of “balance of power and containment considerations” (Paul 2003).[21] This has weakened the NPT credibility, reinforcing India’s decision to continue to disapprove of adhering to it (Paul 2003).
India’s Response to Nuclear Threats
To counter this changing security environment, “India has maintained since 1998 a three-pillar nuclear policy of credible minimum deterrence, no first use, and massive retaliation in case India is attacked first with nuclear weapons” (Dalton and Perkovich 2016).[22] India has also been modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces by continuously upgrading all three legs of “existing nuclear- capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems”. India’s strategic nuclear posture has clearly put emphasis on China, and this is likely to lead to significantly new capabilities being deployed over the next decade” (Kristensen and Korda 2018).[23]
India is the only other country along with China that maintains “No first use” (NFU) policy. However, India along with China has also attempted “deliberate strategic ambiguity”(Larson 2020)[24]As of 2003, Indian government announced that India retains the option of a nuclear first strike “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons”.[25] This nuclear fog remains of considerable influence in ebb and flow of multifaceted India-China equations including its LAC encounters.
Conclusion
Masahiro Kurita (2017) questions, “how sustainable is this China-India situation, particularly given that their nuclear deterrence lacks conditions for military stability?” The continuous border skirmishes with “confrontational dimension” of relationship with the deployment of large military force along the LAC with deteriorating political relations may lead to nuclear escalation probability (Kurita 2017). The probability of “stability-instability paradox” therefore cannot be discounted. (Kurita 2017). This will ensure that in future LAC encounters, both must not miss this essential “linkages between their lower-level competitive actions related to the border dispute and nuclear deterrence” (Kurita 2017). Their triangular nuclear equations — involving China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other — only makes it all the more perilous, not to be missed in all its implied and implicit ramifications for India-China equations.
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[1] China Power Team (2020), “How is China modernizing its nuclear forces?” China Power. December 10, 2019. Updated June 18, 2020. Accessed July 19, 2020. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/
[2]“Protest and Survive,” 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, E.P. Thompson, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1980. Contributed to NPIHP by Matthew Evangelista. Reproduced with the permission of Ben Thompson, Kate Thompson, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, www.cnduk.org, and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, www.russfound.org http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113758
[3]SIPRI Yearbook 2020, Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security URL:https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/nuclear-weapon-modernization-continues-outlook-arms-control-bleak-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now
[4] Kurita, Masahiro (2018), “China-India Relationship and Nuclear Deterrence” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, URL: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2018/bulletin_e2018_4.pdf
[5]O’Donnell, Frank and Alex Bollfrass(2020), Report March 2020 ‘Project on Managing the Atom’ “The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide by Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs URL:https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/india-china-postures/China%20India%20Postures.pdf
[6] Koblentz, Gregory D (2014), Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, Council Special Report No. 71, Council on Foreign Relations, URL:https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Second%20Nuclear%20Age_CSR71.pdf
[7] Times of India (19 May 2020) URL: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-china-deploy-additional-troops-fortify-more-ladakh-areas/articleshow/75816007.cms
[8] Krishnan, Ananth (24 May 2020), “What Explains the India-China border flare-up?” The Hindu, URL:https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-explains-the-india-china-border-flare-up/article31660378.ece
[9] Joshi, Manoj (2018) ,The Wuhan Summit and the India-China Border Dispute, 62 ORF Special Report, June 2018, URL:https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ORF_Special_Report_62_Wuhan.pdf
[10] Singh, Swaran (8 July 2020), “Recognizing the Changed Reality of Indo-China Relations” Global Times, URL:https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1193925.shtml
[11]Riedel, Bruce (2020), “As India and China clash, KFK’s ‘forgotten crisis’ is back”, Brookings.edu, URL: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/17/as-india-and-china-clash-jfks-forgotten-crisis-is-back/
[12] Dalbir Ahlawat & Lindsay Hughes (2018), “India–China Stand-off in Doklam: Aligning Realism with National Characteristics”, The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs Volume 107, 2018 – Issue 5 107:5, 613-625, URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2018.1530376?src=recsys&journalCode=ctrt20
Joshi, Manoj (2018) The Wuhan Summit and the India-China Border Dispute 62 ORF Special Report June 2018, URL:https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ORF_Special_Report_62_Wuhan.pdf
[14] Rajagopalan, Rajeshwari P. (2020), “Border Crisis with China: Does India Face a fait accompli”, Observer Research Foundation, URL:https://www.orfonline.org/research/border-crisis-with-china-does-india-face-a-fait-accompli-66846/
[15] Joshi, Manoj (2018) The Wuhan Summit and the India-China Border Dispute, 62 ORF Special Report, June 2018, URL:https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ORF_Special_Report_62_Wuhan.pdf
[16]Chandorkar, Aashish (20 June 2020), “Galwan Valley face-off: India’s border state infrastructure push has irked China”, Firstpost, URL:https://www.firstpost.com/india/galwan-valley-face-off-indias-border-state-infrastructure-push-has-irked-china-8506691.html
[17] Haidar, Suhasini (24 May 2020) “PLA actions at LAC in Ladakh denote shift from past: experts”, The Hindu, URL: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pla-actions-at-lac-in-ladakh-denote-shift-from-past-experts/article31665294.ece?homepage=true
[18]Krishnan, Ananth (2020), “Beijing think tank links scrapping of Article 370 to LAC tensions” The Hindu, 12 June 2020, URL:https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/beijing-think-tank-links-scrapping-of-article-370-to-lac-tensions/article31815266.ece
[19] Kristensen, Hans M. & Matt Korda (2019) Chinese nuclear forces, 2019, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:4, 171-178, URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511?needAccess=true
[20] US Defense Department (2019), “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, URL: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf
[21] Paul, T.V. (2003), “Chinese- Pakistani Nuclear/ Missile Ties and the Balance of Power” The Nonproliferation Review, URL: https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/102paul.pdf
[22] Dalton, Toby and Perkovich George (2016), India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_273_India_Nuclear_Final.pdf
[23] Kristensen, Hans M. & Matt Korda (2018), “Indian nuclear forces, 2018”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:6, 361-366, URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533162
[24] Larson, Caleb (2020), “Why India’s Nuclear Triad is such a Dangerous Weapon”, National Interest, URL: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-triad-such-dangerous-weapon-142272
[25] MEA (Government of India) (2003), ‘The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, Ministry of External Affairs (2003), URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The+Cabinet+Committee+on+Security+Reviews+perationalization+of+Indias+Nuclear+Doctrine
Guest Column by Silky Kaur
Doctoral student with the Diplomacy and Disarmament program of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
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