China and the Middle East

Various significant dealings took place between China and the Middle East since the early days of the Silk Road. Silk, along with Arabian horses, encouraged and improved trade relations between China, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The arrival of Islam played an important role in improving Sino-Islamic relations that were marked on the whole by close collaboration, even though at times with minor military encounters, for instance the Battle of Talas in 750 AD. In conformity with Islamic law, the acrimony ended on the battlefield, and subsequently the Abbasids strived for amicable relations with China based on trade, and China responded by allowing Muslim immigration into its territory. During the early twentieth century and in the republican era, Muslims played an active part in politics and held important positions in the state. However, under the dispensation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), they had to endure like any other religious community in China. Eventually, China initiated a process of re-construal of the Holy Quran, in conformity with its socialist and economic objectives.

For a considerable period of time, the Middle East was not strategically significant for the People’s Republic of China. The Middle East, on the other hand, was not particularly positively inclined towards China. The Islamic world was apprehensive about communism. The communist ideology was perceived as un-Islamic. In the socialist world, it was the Soviet Union which was the preferred ally in the Middle East and the frequent attempts by the communist Chinese dispensation to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Arab states made it even more unpopular. China, thus longed for political legitimacy in the Middle East. The People’s Republic of China wanted to be accepted as the real China instead of Taiwan and wanted support from the region for a legitimate place in the United Nations. The means by which China went about to achieve its desired objectives were by providing political, economic, ideological and military assistance to the region. It took China around four decades to establish its political legitimacy in the region.  The recognition of the United Nations and the acquisition of permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations brought about a significant change in its ambitions and influence with regard to the region in particular and the global arena in general. The nations of the Middle East and North Africa in due course of time accepted China as a dominant player in the international arena.  China developed a nuanced and intricate foreign policy in the region. While it was successful in building a good rapport and exerting considerable, political, economic and military influence over many countries, it also had a its fair share of tensions with others.

It is its military association with the countries of the Middle East that has caused discomfiture to China with regard to its relations with the US and the West. China’s own policy of approval of the non-proliferation regime has created serious dilemmas with respect to its policies in the Middle East and North Africa as it now endeavours to project itself as a mature and responsible power. In the domain of economics, the Chinese policy has evolved from providing cheap consumer goods for immigrants in the Persian Gulf region to looking at it as a market for exporting surplus labourers. It is partaking in major construction projections in the Middle East and North Africa. From looking at the region as a source for oil, China is now looking at joint oil explorations and oil pipelines. China is now perceived as a global power to reckon with in the region. In present times, China appears to be resolute in intensifying its relations with the Middle East. China is deeply associated with political developments, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings with reference to its politics, implications, limitations and opportunities. China sells arms and buys weapons from the Middle East. Hitherto relations between China and the Middle East could be defined by cultural events such as ‘festivals, New Year celebrations, educational opportunities and cuisine.’ Although there was some antipathy towards China’s policy with reference to the Arab Uprisings, the public and governments of the Middle East seem by and large enthusiastic about China’s greater participation in the region.

The political and social turmoil in the Arab world resonated outside the confines of the Middle East and China was profoundly affected by the upheavals. Since a decade prior to the eruption of the uprisings, Beijing had pursued closer connections/relations with the deeply ingrained authoritarian leaderships in the Middle East, thinking that its interests and requirements in the region would be safeguarded by these ties. The astonishing developments within the region made China apprehensive with regard to leadership stability. China could no longer be impervious to and shielded from the upheavals in the Middle East, and its political and financial investments in a few cases were at risk. These conditions were the result of China’s “going out” policy, by which it had ‘pursued trade, investment, and energy ties across the region. The participation of Chinese state-owned enterprises and private firms in some key development projects across the Middle East had augmented significantly in the decade preceding the uprisings. Though China was not alone in facing the upheavals of 2011, it was compelled to evaluate its interests and future policies in a politically and socially rejuvenated Middle East, where the eventual implications were far from assured.

China’s requirements have been propelling it towards the Middle East. For its fuel needs and to sustain economic development, China has been significantly dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The resource rich and explosive Middle East has been a crucial centre of great significance for the Asia-Pacific and the key for China’s sustained economic affluence. As a result in spite of the U.S. efforts to shift balance away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East has become an arena for another ‘Great Game,’ one that was perceived as capable of unavoidably placing the U.S against China in a regional competition for ‘influence and power.’ After a prolonged period of isolating itself from the Middle East, China is now moving closer to the region, both in terms of ‘sectarian feuds’ and its ‘vital oil reserves.’ It is keen on cultivating a Middle East with minimal sectarian strife primarily due to its foreign policy initiative called ‘the One Belt One Road initiative.’ The initiative is in the nature of a plan to link the landmass and contiguous waterways extending from China to the centre of Europe in a complex of trade and transportation corridors. This is considered to be vital for revitalizing economic growth in Asia and generating new markets for Chinese goods and services. China has spent a colossal amount in this endeavour which is aimed at reinvigorating the Chinese economy. Moreover, it posits Xinjiang as a future entry point to both Central and South Asia. A divided and chaotic Middle East stands in the way of this ambitious project. There is an apprehension that a sizeable number of Uyghurs may have actually joined the Islamic State, who could return to create turmoil in western China and dislocate the Belt and Road project. This initiative could actually be employed by China to reduce tension between the Shiite and Sunni states in the form of collaborative ventures such as the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea coast and a Silk Road high speed railway linking Xinjiang and Tehran via the Central Asian Sunnis states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The association between China and the Middle East goes a long way. It can be traced to the early days of the Silk Road. However, for a significant phase, the Middle East was not in the strategic map of the People’s Republic of China and the Middle East, conversely, was not positively disposed towards China. With it induction into the Security Council of the United Nations as a permanent member, China began to make inroads into the Middle East. Over a period of time, China began harbouring an ambition to become a global power to reckon with and concurrently it began to be perceived as a global power and not merely an Asian one. The Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011 took China by surprise. Internally, it was worried about the repercussions within China particularly in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Externally, China was apprehensive due to its close ties with many of the autocratic regimes in the region. However, China was able to deftly and rather successfully handle both the perceived domestic and foreign policy crises arising out of the Arab uprisings. The ‘Arab Spring’ never really came to China and the Chinese government was able to establish economic and political ties with the transitional regimes in the Middle East. In the post Arab Uprisings scenario the crux of China’s policy in the Middle East lies in developing and expanding economic and trade connections and linkages. The Chinese economic presence is manifestly visible in the Middle East. In the political arena China is keen on exploiting its rapport with the Shiite and Sunni powers. China has redefined the meaning of national security imparting an element of globalization to it. It is now extensively engaged in multilateral efforts at peace keeping in the Middle East, which is being augmented by an absolute expansion of its military capacity. In other words, China has at long last realized that the Middle East is way too significant to be left to others, ignoring it may well turn out to be at its own risk.

Priya

6/4/2017

References

Muhammad S.Olimat, China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring, London and New York: Routledge, 2013

P.R.Kumaraswamy (Ed), China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence, (Introduction). New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications, 1999

Visit for more information