Brexit in Transit

Quest for Time

Britain formally departs from the European Union on 29 March 2019. An agreement was reached on 19 March 2018 between the European Union and Britain on the terms and conditions of a 21 month transition period wherein Britain will remain within Europe’s economic system to circumvent the damaging repercussions of what has been termed as ‘hard-Brexit’ or ‘cliff-edge Brexit’ in which all agreements would be terminated overnight on 29 March 2019. A transition accord was signed to ensure a smooth withdrawal. Subsequently, a withdrawal agreement has been signed between Britain and EU, this month but Prime Minister Theresa May has delayed a parliament vote on the deal because most MPs were expected to reject it. What adds to the climate of uncertainty is the border issue between Northern Ireland and Ireland. The former is a part of the United Kingdom whereas the latter will remain within the European Union. Opinion within Britain remains divided on the issue. Prime Minister Theresa May is faced with an intimidating task of keeping members of her cabinet and the Conservative party, vociferous proponents of Brexit such as Boris Johnson, and Jacob Rees-Mogg with her to contend with her Labour party opponents who prefer to keep the customs union within the European Union. The problem for Theresa May is that she does not have the required numbers within the Parliament (though she has survived a vote of confidence on 13 December 2018) but does have a number of critics without who contend that a “no-deal Brexit would leave the UK near bankrupt”.

The foremost concern that seemed to accompany the transitional process is its rather brief duration. The text of the withdrawal agreement with highlighted portions to illustrate areas that have been settled and those that remain to be negotiated upon indicate that Britain has by and large agreed to retain the ‘status quo’, that is, it will continue to fulfil most of its commitments to the EU while giving up its voting rights. Stubborn opponents and prickly issues were won over or compromised. For instance, the compliance of one of the most pro-Brexit Tory MPs, Jacob Rees-Mogg, who had once compared ‘a status-quo transition to being a vassal state’ and Britain’s decision to remain in the EU’s common fisheries policy till the beginning of 2021, a thorny issue for the Scottish Conservatives, in particular. However, perhaps at the core of all apprehensions is the time period of transition, while Theresa May had bargained for ‘around two years’ and others within the government had hoped for a longer duration, what they got instead was 21 months, until the end of 2020.  Even as there persists a degree of ambiguity regarding the likelihood of the extension in legal and political terms, the European Parliament has declared time and again that there is no room for renegotiation.  Most members of the ‘Commons Brexit Committee’ wanted an extension of Article 50’s* two-year cut-off date with the home affairs committee in particular urging for more time to facilitate continued collaboration on matters pertaining to ‘justice and domestic security.’ Thus paucity of time and both its expected and unexpected corollaries appear to be the vital issues with regard to the period of transition.

Then and Now

March 2017 witnessed the evocation of Article 50 in the midst of conjectures that possibly the most favourable upshot would be to minimise the unfavourable impact for both the United Kingdom and the European Union.  Both sides reminded each other of their obligations, albeit with subtlety and cautioned about the unjustifiable costs of not arriving at an appropriate agreement.  That was a period of relative calm as far as global trade and security was concerned unlike in the case of Brexit and the EU. The latter was contending with domestic issues arising out of Britain’s decision to quit, such as the economic repercussions for the United Kingdom, whether Brexit could trigger an exodus from the European Union and its impact on the elections in a number of European countries. The circumstances have changed a year later as global insecurity occupies centre stage in public debates; as the global trade war with the United States at the helm and intensifying strains with Russia are the focal points along with their implications for Brexit.

The meetings of the European Council to discuss Brexit in end March 2018 were overshadowed by antagonistic relations between Russia and the EU particularly over the nerve gas incident in Salisbury involving former Russian undercover agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter. EU’s support for the UK in this case by way of holding the Russian Federation responsible for the incident and its retaliatory actions in the nature of reviewing its staff in Russia as well as devising means to fortify the EU’s ability to withstand chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks in alliance with NATO seemed to convey an important message to the outside world that the UK and EU member states would continue to collaborate over issues related to security and terrorism. Another instance of collaboration between the European Union and the United Kingdom despite Brexit has been in the realm of tariff imposition, a policy supported and implemented by the United States under Donald Trump but opposed by the EU and UK. Furthermore, new agreements to strengthen ties between universities in EU and UK have been reached despite Brexit.

The connotations of Brexit in an uncertain world are difficult to gauge. 2017 was privy to increased animosity between the United Kingdom and the European Union. The slow progress of the negotiation process antagonised the pro-Brexit lobby. However, the incidents that took place and were deliberated upon rather sombrely in late March 2018 appeared to indicate a sense of camaraderie and the desire for a reciprocally beneficial solution to the impasse. The recognition of vulnerability associated in pursuing an isolated or tangential path, especially in the context of ‘global trade, data exchange, nuclear protection, aviation and domestic security’ on the part of both protagonists has culminated in a degree of give and take as both sides are at least displaying a degree of cohesiveness in issues which have global implications. The leaning towards a rapprochement continues as individual states such as Germany and the European parliament on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, on the other, have time and again demonstrated restraint and magnanimity as the circumstances called for.

Rereading the Brexit Debate

The conversations on Brexit have been framed within a binary construct.  Within the United Kingdom the dialogue has centred on the implications and prospects for British society and polity in a vacuum as the rest of Europe has been ignored, whereas in the remaining EU bloc Brexit has been interpreted in the backdrop of and as a consequence of British eccentricity.  The linkages between Brexit and the remaining EU27 have not found adequate resonance in the analyses on Brexit which has been equated with Britain. The fact of the matter is that the roots of Brexit can be traced to the deficiencies inherent in the European Union. Brexit cannot be read as an isolated phenomenon, it is rather an expression/articulation of the widespread apprehensions across Europe. In addition to the social and political aspects, the institutions of the European Union have time and again faced what has been termed as a ‘legitimacy crisis’. In fact the British resistance eventually culminating in Brexit is a reflection of the growing perception that the institutions of the EU are lacking in the attributes of democratisation and legitimacy.

An important trigger in the Brexit process has been the financial crisis of 2008-2009 that aroused a wave of popular sentiments and scepticism towards project Europe. The lacunae within the structure of monetary integration lay uncovered. Despite the mounting unemployment, economic sluggishness, and the ever-increasing public deficits, the helplessness of the states was evident as they could not devalue their currencies due to the monetary union. The resultant ‘austerity measures’ lead to widespread curtailment of public services which in turn gave rise to resentment against the political authorities. Adding to the mayhem was the lack of a coordinated approach due to the unavailability of a banking regulator encompassing the EU member-states. The picture has become even more complicated in recent times due to the far-reaching political changes across Europe wherein the hitherto political fringe sceptical of a pan-European project have come to occupy  the political centre. The popular anxiety over issues of immigration and the loss of national identity has encouraged right-wing populism which has made a dent in the popular support for the centre-left establishment parties across the continent.

In a nutshell, popular disillusionment with the policies of the European Union and their consequences had transcended the European continent and was not confined to the United Kingdom.  As such, any dialogue regarding Brexit should be contextualised within the wider canvas of European discontent along with issues of ‘British identity, society, culture and polity.’ While it is true that Brexit will have a profound impact on the United Kingdom, its repercussions for the EU itself and Europe at large should not be underscored. The significance of Brexit also lies in the change in the power equilibrium as far as policy making is concerned within the EU apparatus as it now hinges on France and Germany. Europe, post Brexit needs to re-read and re-envisage its role in the global polity and economy. It needs to find the appropriate symmetry between the demand and supply factors of the economy on the one hand, and the pursuit of social protection for the populace, on the other. This needs to be supplemented by a process of democratisation which shall provide the institution with an element of legitimacy. Thus Brexit has to be read in its entirety, that is, in conjunction with and in the backdrop of the broader European landscape.

Priya

(15/12/2018)

*Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty states “Any member state may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. A member state which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention”

References

Martill, Benjamin and Staiger, Uta (Eds) (2018), Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe, University College London Press: London.

——— (2018), ‘The Brexit debate at home and abroad’, openDemocracy.net; 25 February

Pisauro, Andrea (2018), ‘How to democratise Brexit and take back control of our future: an appeal to Jeremy Corbyn’, openDemocracy.net; 30 March.

Series of recent articles by Stephen Castles on Brexit in the New York Times.

Series of recent articles in Al Jazeera.

Series of recent articles in The Independent