As Kabul Falls, Can New Delhi Rise to the Occasion?
Posted on : August 28, 2021Author : Ratnadeep Maitra
The Talibanisation of Afghanistan is a reality now. The relentless blitzkrieg of the Taliban militants, successfully penetrating the heart of Kabul, has surely led to tectonic shifts in the geopolitical alignments in the region and beyond, “changing things upside down”, as per Gautam Mukhopadhyay. Seen in this light, the unfolding developments, must be critically analyzed from the vantage point of India, and this is precisely what this piece strives for. However, before delving deep into India’s choices, it becomes equally imperative to see how our neighbours perceive the recent Taliban victory.
By the dint of geographical proximity and permeable border, it is a no-brainer that Pakistan would be an enthusiastic player in the Afghan affair, more so because the political office in Kabul can now be subjected to its influence, as posited by Michael Kugelman. Perhaps, this is also the most opportune moment for China to move towards a more elaborate role in the region, as vindicated by the recent meet of Wang Yi with senior Taliban leaders, thereby shedding its hitherto reticent image. Reading these two in tandem, might give the whiff of a major setback to New Delhi, something Shyam Saran has insinuated, but there are contesting opinions on the same. J.N Mishra, for instance gives a fresh perspective on how a predominantly Pashtun-based Taliban has never acknowledged the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, something which might trouble the political premiers at Islamabad. Hence, the trajectory of the relationship between Pakistan and its so called surrogate might not be as simple as it appears. However, this is where, Pakistan’s big brother China can step in. It has already revealed its intentions of extensively investing in Kabul, while harnessing the mineral resources to its own advantage. Where bullets failed, maybe billions can succeed, will surely be the underlying rationale behind the Chinese-engagement. Capturing the situation in a nutshell, Gautam Mukhopadhyay posits that “China and Pakistan would piggyback on each other in Afghanistan”.
As the much touted American War on Terror draws towards a hurried end, it leaves India on a diplomatic tightrope to say the least. The embarrassing collapse of the Afghan democracy is more of a stinging reminder of the reverses that might be made on a host of developmental, sociocultural and political fronts, which India had so patiently nurtured over the last two decades. For the longest time, while Washington had taken up the cudgel for intercepting the threat of jihadi networks, India had been investing heavily on political, educational, medical and infrastructural projects. Over and above India’s soft power diplomacy directed at “winning hearts and minds” in Afghanistan, especially through art, culture, music, films and even cricket had augmented a high degree of trust in India would surely lose a part of its strategic leverage, in the wake of an abrupt stoppage of such projects. In a similar vein, while New Delhi never had the privilege of geographical proximity to Kabul, its four consulates stationed there, offered it an “over the horizon” influence, infusing fear in the minds of the generals in Rawalpindi, of a possible retaliation in Baluchistan employing Afghan collaborators, in response to any potential Pakistan-sponsored tension in Kashmir. However, with the hasty closure of all four consulates and the subsequent evacuation of its plenipotentiaries, India ceases to have any diplomatic representation in Kabul, even when the British and the French embassies continue to operate. In this regard, former diplomat Bhadrakumar has strongly asserted how India has lost a great window, to cultivate an independent Afghan policy, devoid of American patronage.
It is instructive at this point to revisit the prophetic words of K.M. Pannikkar, who maintained that developments in the Kabul valley, would exert a profound influence in the empires of the Gangetic plains. Indeed, there would be countless mercenaries consolidating their position in the valley, before orchestrating bloody attacks in the heartland of India. Although Bhadrakumar maintains that the paranoia around such a potential spillover is unwarranted, given the “Afghan-centric” agenda of Taliban, it still remains a burgeoning challenge, and the stakeholders in Delhi must bolster and ramp up their defenses, to contain waves of jihadism, while preempting Kashmir from becoming the next flashpoint of Taliban fanaticism. It also must be noted that New Delhi would have the global opinion in its favour, with a greater acceptance of transnational terrorism , and with no major power willing to see Afghanistan resurrect as a safe haven for terror-mongers.
This raises another crucial aspect of recognition of the Taliban regime. While countries like Canada have avowedly proclaimed their reluctance to do so, it would be a much tougher choice for India, especially if Moscow and Beijing decide to acknowledge it. While, diplomacy demands that India bury the past and sustain a conduit of communication with the Taliban, the evocative memory of the Taliban providing a safe passage to the hijackers of IC 814 in 1999, may pose a potential hindrance to such an engagement. Strategic patience might be quite useful for India in this regard, and if the Taliban 2.0 makes a departure from their previous barbaric avatar, the propensity of reaching out to them cannot be written off. It will also be interesting to examine, whether a more confident and powerful Taliban 2.0 would seek to gain substantial autonomy from Pakistani leverage, or continue being its veritable arm. The former development might even prompt the Taliban to reach out to New Delhi, in a bid to countervail Islamabad.
On the contrary, if the moderating tone within the Taliban remains a façade, with ground reports betraying their verbal promises, New Delhi must seek to put its weight behind the anti-Taliban resistance movements, albeit scattered across Afghanistan. More important, India must assist its allies in Afghanistan, through shelter in their territory, case in point, the concerted efforts to “rescue” Afghan nationals by permitting them to board Indian flights, notwithstanding concomitant complications of the virus. While this may come off as an emotional response in the short term, its long term ramifications will bear fruits for New Delhi, when things change for the better in Kabul.
It is evident from the aforementioned arguments, that on the Afghan question, India must pursue the policy of “masterly inactivity”, premised on the dexterous deployment of scarce resources at the opportune time and place, to reap the maximum benefits. The policy recognizes the ill-effects of a forward-looking posture aimed at dominance, and instead focuses on effectively grappling with the multitude paradoxes within Afghanistan through subtleties and nuances. New Delhi has always championed a modernization drive in Kabul, and advocated for its greater autonomy vis-à-vis Islamabad. Thus, while Pakistan’s hegemonic ambitions alienate the Afghans, the Indian efforts are embraced with open arms. Although, it is truism, that India has overemphasized on soft power stratagem in a hard country like Afghanistan, but its respect for values of sovereignty, autonomy and nationalism, will always find currency in Kabul, regardless of the nature of the regime. Over and above India’s concerted efforts directed at “winning hearts and minds” in Afghanistan, especially through art, culture, music, films and even cricket has coalesced to form an enduring degree of trust, tough to match.
Thus it is safe to conclude that while a “New Great Game” is waiting to commence in the region, with a diplomatic cocktail of strategic patience, active communication conduit and political sensibility, India can channelize its immense potential in “leading from behind”.
Notes
- J.N Mishra and Gautam Mukhopadhyay have been cited by Vikas Pandey in his article in BBC News titled, “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s victory will test India, and peace in South Asia”
- K.M. Pannikkar has been cited by C. Raja Mohan in his article in The Indian Express titled, “Taliban has taken Kabul. Delhi must watch, not pronounce doom”.
References
1.Mohan, C. Raja (2021). “Taliban has taken Kabul. Delhi must watch, not pronounce doom”. IN The Indian Express. 18th August, 2021.
2. Pandey, Vikas (2021). “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s victory will test India and peace in South Asia”. IN BBC News. 18th August, 2021
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-5824030)
3. Sareen, Sushant (2021). “Afghanistan is a hard country and India has focussed more on soft power.” IN The Print. 18th August 2021
4. “What the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan means for India and Pakistan” (2021). IN The Economist. 21st August.
5. Mohan, C. Raja (2021). “It is Pakistan’s moment of triumph in Afghanistan, but India must bet on patience. IN The Indian Express. 25th August, 2021.
6. Bhadrakumar, M. K (2021). “ Taliban is not what it was 20 years ago”. IN The Indian Express. 20th August, 2021
(https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/who-are-taliban-afghanistan-taliban-news-7460403/)
7. Tandon, Bhairvi (2019). “ India’s soft power advantage in the great game of Afghanistan”. IN Observer Research Foundation. 1st July,
8.“Taliban 1.0 Pretending to be Taliban 2.0, Takeover an Undoubted Setback for India : Shyam Saran”. (2021). IN The Wire. 21st August 2021.
(https://youtu.be/kBfJtltknJ4)
Ratnadeep Maitra
Intern, Asia in Global Affairs
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