Forced’ migration stands in opposition to ‘flows’ that traditionally defined movement in the region now identified as stretching from  Afghanistan to Central and West Asia. Movements of nomadic pastoralist societies but also movements resulting from trade, pilgrimage and conquest marked the landscape of the region since times immemorial. With colonial redrawing of the political map, these everyday movements were sought to be restricted in a variety of ways. Subsequently, sedentarization, the Soviet collectivization campaign, forced deportation of minorities during and after the world wars and the buffer status that Afghanistan had in the ‘great game’ has traditionally been identified as the cause of forced migration and displacement in the region. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states a number of other issues have assumed importance in the interpretation of forced migration and refugees. State building processes across the region have left people stateless as they fall outside the definition of citizens (Uzbek brides in Kyrgyzstan), ethnic conflicts have encouraged movements across borders that have subsequently been met by resistance from the host state as upsetting demographic balance (Uzbeks who crossed the border into Kyrgyzstan after 2005) economic imperatives have led to labour migration, in certain cases resentment among displaced peoples have encouraged them to join resistance movements in other parts of the globe (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan joining Islamic State) and environmental degradation has led to displacement (Aral Sea). Most of these movements cannot be comprehended through a statistical approach since the flows escape official census. There is also the trend of the return of the refugee with all the associated institutional issues (the return of Afghan refugees). In certain cases states have actively encouraged return for a variety of political reasons (the Uzbek government have asked for the return of migrants from Russia) and the reluctance towards return has come from the migrants. In other situations refugees have become politically significant for states who wish to replace regimes in neighbouring states or even transform border demarcations (Turkish government is asking for a buffer zone between Turkey and Syria to restrict the movement of Syrian refugees into Turkey). All of these invite new interpretations in the study of forced migration and refugees globally but more particularly in the Central and West Asian regions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the majoritarian nationalism that gained ground in the Central Asian states jeopardized the ethnic balance. This resulted in the movement of Russian minorities as a response to the anticipated loss of status and politicization of political life. In a number of cases it also led to statelessness. Large numbers of people with different ethnic backgrounds and holding Soviet documents discovered that new nationality laws of emerging sovereign states left them out of the definition of a citizen though in most cases constitutions recognized all people living within its territorial boundaries as citizens. However, not all of them acceded to UN conventions on refugees and statelessness. This was complicated by the fact that the history of borders in the region is problematic and the territories of the five states are closely interwoven with the existence of a number of enclaves. Post delimitation the borders were left flexible within a broader system where people shared a common Soviet passport and movement and employment was unrestricted. This, of course, changed in the post 1991 period. In most cases, as in the Ferghana Valley where populations were mixed movements, trade, marriages continued unhindered. Since movement across the borders in the valley did not require documentation old Soviet passports were often not changed to new national ones. From 1999 and particularly since 2005 when borders (like the Uzbek-Kyrgyz or Uzbek-Tajik) were fenced and visa regimes were introduced large numbers of people found themselves stateless. Statelessness is not just the result of circumstances (like the border brides of Central Asia) but also the result of events like riots that leave people without documentation (the Uzbek Kyrgyz riots in Osh). In recent times citizenship rules have been used in Uzbekistan as a political instrument to punish non-compliance with the ruling establishment and passports have been cancelled leaving nationals stranded in third countries.

There is a similar history of movement between, to and from the region that is identified as West Asia today. This history, however, is very different from the complex humanitarian crisis that has been unfolding in recent years leading to growing numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons. This migration has affected the social fabric, security, administrative structures and economies of a number of states in the region and has resulted in tragic loss of life. A significant number of those displaced are due to civil wars and insurgency in Syria, Libya, Yemen, South Sudan and Iraq, Somalia as well as the continuing Israel-Palestine conflict, though the largest numbers are now from Syria. Unprecedented violence, identity based persecution and repression has resulted in growing numbers of refugees, who are caught in the cross fire between the Islamic State, the Syrian Kurdish army and states reluctant to host them, has added to the conundrum of issues. This is compounded by the insecurity of neighbouring states like Turkey whose migration identity has shifted from being a country of emigration and transit to becoming a destination for immigrants and people fleeing conflict and therefore requiring an entirely new regime of legislation to deal with people who are identified as ‘guests’. But more than security concerns there remains the problems of integrating a significantly large population with issues like work permit for the migrants remaining unresolved.

It is often argued that binary oppositions between citizenship and statelessness between national territoriality and its absence are not useful for thinking about the new configurations of space and new combination of factors that affect political mobilizations and claims. Rights and entitlements once associated with citizens are now becoming dispersed among populations who can include non- citizens. The difference between having and not having citizenship is becoming blurred as territorialisation of entitlements is increasingly made in spaces beyond the state. However, as long as states remain as ultimate arbitrators of domestic affairs the question of statelessness, citizenship and migrants will remain significant.

Anita

May 28, 2017

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