100 Years and Beyond: The Rise and Rise of the Chinese Communist Party

“Who controls the past, controls the future. Who controls the present, controls the past”. Borrowing an Orwellian lexicon seems apposite, while tracing the trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party. As the centenary celebrations of the party took place on 1^st July, its incredible journey from an ignoble origin to an unquestioned behemoth, thumping its authority over one-fifth of the world population, controlling a gigantic economy, second to only U.S., and outlasting its half patron-half rival Soviet Union, remains an enigma to politicians and pundits alike. Needless to say, its power emanates from a cocktail of staunch discipline, clamping down on dissent, turning a Nelson’s eye to basic human rights, and finally an unrelenting focus on indoctrination and propaganda.

While the party has exhibited increasing malleability over the decades, by mobilising the “have-nots” as the main foot soldiers of revolution on one end, and embracing cut-throat capitalism to expedite development on the other, it is the narrative of “national rejuvenation” that has always remained the centrepiece, in the Chinese jigsaw. The CCP has always been pushed as the sole agency, for reviving the long-lost stature of China at the world stage, especially after decades of setback.

It is true that historical lessons can be instrumentalized for better governance. But if concocted historical memories are wantonly constructed, and fed into the popular public imagination, through ideological state apparatuses, then it can be weaponised at will, by the political elites to defend their policy-decisions. While contemporary examples of Brexit in U.K. or even the Ram Mandir dispute in India, have been particularly governed by such “romanticisation of historical memories”, it is the CCP which has adroitly periodized and narrativized a “century of humiliation”, as a popular trope, to capture the zeitgeist of the nation.

The time period has been suitably kept between the inception of the First Opium War (1839) and the institution of the People’s Republic of China (1949), subtly suggestive of how only a communist China could undo the wrongs of the past, and throw a challenge to the foreign imperial powers. The humiliation trope encapsulated in the slogan – “China is not the country it was 100 years ago” – has not only been employed to contrapose a pre-1949 China with its current power calculus, but also to showcase its unflinching posture with respect to repeated foreign castigations and demands, in stark contrast to its past.

In this regard, it is important to examine how the remarks of the Chinese foreign ministry – “China is not the China of 120 years ago” – as a retort to sanctions over the alleged contravention of human rights in Xinjiang, during an engagement of the plenipotentiaries of both the countries in Alaska, hold relevance. The rationale behind such a renewed yet calculated rhetoric, can be captured by turning the pages of history. During the Boxer protocol meetings of 1901, a much-incapacitated Qing dynasty, was compelled to concede massive indemnities as restitution for the Boxer rebellion. Thus, even a supposedly benign tweaking of the time span from 100 to 120 years, can be situated within the larger project of retaining their “sufferings” of the past, in public memory.

While the politics of remembering, dominates the popular discourse in China, so does the politics of forgetting. The recent inauguration of a museum in Beijing, as a tribute to the CCP, and the different watershed moments in its chequered history, is a case in point. Quite evidently, it overtly glorifies how the party has heralded a permanent peace and prosperity to the nation-state, yet the history it propagates, is filtered and cleansed of any uncomfortable episode. This resonates with the official position of the Chinese political leadership as well. For instance, despite the 14 million Chinese casualties in the escalated conflict against Japan, it is assertively proclaimed as the “first complete victory in a recent war, where China resisted the invasion of a foreign enemy”.

The boundaries of history are neatly delineated, with even a mere discussion or critical exposition of certain events, euphemistically dubbed as “historical nihilism”, perceived as grave transgression inviting stringent repercussions. While the road to the Open-Door Policy, can be easily deliberated over, the Tiananmen Square protests, remain a restricted territory. While the brutalities unleashed by the Cultural Revolution, under the aegis of Mao, find a negligible space in the academic discourse, the ravages of the Great Leap Forward, are conspicuous by their absence.

It is often posited by scholars, that the CCP in its present form and shape, would appear to Mao, as an alien entity, where the pristine Marxist-Leninist postulates are viewed as anachronistic theoretical formulations, with not much practicability. This is half-true at best, for the Chinese attachment to Marxist principles, though greatly toned down, is still in vogue. This is vindicated by a statement of Xi in one of the politburo study-sessions, where he articulated his desire to “open up new frontiers for Marxist political economy”. Similarly, taking a leaf out of the Leninist paradigm, wherein “rectification campaigns” were undertaken by rigorously internalising Leninist thought, to dispel ideological deviance and single out potential heretics, a more futuristic variant of the same has been institutionalized in China, in the form of software applications, to test one’s understanding of the Xi Jinping Thought.

The continuities and ruptures between Mao’s CCP and Xi’s CCP deserve equal attention. The most prominent continuity in the functioning of the party machinery between the two junctures, has been its unswerving commitment to the training of the party elites. This has remained the cornerstone of the CCP, restating its belief in staunchly loyal party leaders to forge mass solidarity. However, Mao’s larger telos was in sync with the theoretical axioms of Marxism, premised on identifying the proletariat working class as the “us” and the bourgeoise capitalists as the “them”.  Such an understanding has been consciously ossified, ever since Jiang Zemin whole-heartedly welcomed the possibility of a private entrepreneur to rise to the upper echelons of the party. More importantly, Mao’s political project was built on a bedrock of disdain for Confucian values of the Chinese antiquity, case in point, the deracination of Qufu, the hometown of Confucius during the Cultural Revolution. In stark contrast, under Xi, the Confucian traditions have become more mainstream, with their distinct nomenclature pervading the socialist maxims. Perhaps, the spread of principles such as hierarchy, order and devotion, is seen as a necessary precondition to curb any popular uprising, in an increasingly asymmetrical China.

Notwithstanding, the myriad contentions associated with its structural elements and functional mechanisms, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) definitively scores brownie points, in adroitly harnessing the Chinese economy, to optimally sustain a consistent, brisk-paced pattern of development. The gradual enhancement of the life chances of Chinese denizens, reiterates the truest of Marxist exposition, that even a highly populated nation-state, can foster societal stabilization and governance legitimation, riding on the waves of an economic boom.

A more, long-drawn phenomenon operating at the societal level, has been the transmogrification of the CCP, from a formal ruling-party category, into an all-encompassing category, encapsulating the entire nation. The organizational framework of the party, has penetrated every corner of the country, while its defining elements have been embedded in everyday life. With over 90 million active members, the CCP boasts of having at least one dedicated cadre, in every four households. By politically catering to the diverse social groups across the length and breadth of China, the CCP has essentially become a “social aggregation” devoid of any contesting force, thereby curbing the scope for any “political antagonism”.

However, it is equally instructive to take note of the burgeoning issues, that continue to scar the Chinese body polity, till date, euphemistically dubbed as “extremely intricate situations” by their current premier Xi Jinping. The foremost problem pertains to corruption within the party ranks. Although sounding banal, reports have suggested how corruption cases, more often than not, have seen the light of the day, either due to sheer luck or by a sensational turn of events – case in point, the unscrupulous proclivities of Ling Jihua, former chief of the General Office of CCP, grabbed headlines, not until his son raced a plush sports car around Beijing, and met with an accident. Though there have been a significant number of anti-corruption drives, a deep-seated skepticism prevails around them, for the ventures are often a smoke-screen to neutralize political rivals. The daunting task at hand, is to energetically weed out corruption, after untangling the curtains concealing the same.

The intensified modernization drives have given birth to an educated, proficient and well-to-do middle class in China, which has gained exposure to the Anglo-American media conduits. Seen in this light, any self-imposed isolation from such networks, foisted by the CCP over its people, have sought to spark a massive furor. The academic circuits have unequivocally articulated how such a “network blockage” would gravely undermine the route between domestic and global academic research. Despite its misplaced apprehensions, over the potency of the Internet, to unleash forces destabilizing the Chinese governance, the CCP must strive to attain an equilibrium, wherein the internet is democratized to the vast populace, while its own publicity campaigns are also undertaken parallelly.

Lastly, the inability of the CCP to export its governance model to other countries, especially in the developing-bloc, may sow seeds of doubt within the Chinese public in the long run. One of the biggest reasons attributable to this, is the dissemination and whole-hearted acceptance of the Westernized axioms of plurality of thought, separation of institutional powers, or even vibrant electoral competition, around the world. While a more feasible short-term choice before the CCP, lies in transmitting some of its specific practices, such as bolstering institutions or publicity endeavors, to other nations, it is safe to aver that, its moment of political-breakthrough is yet to fructify.

In closing, one must submit that, for every monumental achievement of China under the stewardship of the CCP, there is a past, it chooses to forget. For every Great Leap Forward, the name of Peng Dehuai, who rationally criticized it and got purged, gets obliterated. For every Cultural Revolution, with its clarion call to “Bombard the headquarters”, the resultant deaths in millions, gets invisibilised. And for every Tiananmen Square massacre, a certain Zhao Ziyang , who sympathized with the students, gets erased from public memory. Perhaps, this is the  biggest weakness of the CCP even after hundred years of functioning. The longest running communist party in the world still cannot trust its own citizens, give them a space to freely voice their opinion, and empower them to choose their own leaders.

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Ratnadeep Maitra

Intern, Asia in Global Affairs