QUAD: A Holistic Reassessment
Posted on : November 13, 2021Author : Akanksha Tiwari
As a response to escalating Chinese regional belligerence, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or QUAD, eventually took off. The QUAD is a political and military alliance comprising India, Japan, Australia, and the United States of America, which was first proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007. However, the consortium’s instability was underscored by the lack of clear aims and guidelines, making it vulnerable in the eyes of China.
As a matter of fact, Australia’s foreign minister, Stephen Smith, unilaterally declared Australia’s resignation from the QUAD at a meeting with China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, in 2008. As a result, India, too, under the leadership of Dr Manmohan Singh, withdrew its participation.
Therefore, until today, the QUAD has been a fragile alliance, with its leaders always hesitating to join. The consortium’s founding in 2007 was not accompanied by a significant commitment from the countries that comprised it.
However, with the ever-mounting Chinese aggression and tensions in the South China Sea that raised alarming concerns and threats in the region, this security cooperation earned much attention and support. This eventually led to the revival of the QUAD after the 31st ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit in Manila, 2017. Since then, the union has met several times and shares the same vision to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Apart from the common challenges, there are several factors that lures the members into joining the Quad.
What was America’s motive of joining?
It goes without saying that the increasing Chinese traditional and non-traditional threats have questioned America’s superpower and the security concerns of countries all across the globe, thereby making the need for the emergence of Quad, in this contemporary world, all the more significant. Moreover, the United States also benefits from this alliance for several other reasons. Firstly, the trade benefits. The Indo-Pacific, which straddles two seas and many continents, is vital to the U.S maritime interests. In 2019, the area saw $1.9 trillion in commerce from the United States. This year, it is estimated that 42 per cent of global exports and 38 per cent of worldwide imports will move across the region. Secondly, trade deficits and employment losses to China. In 2019, the manager of the Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey, voiced support for pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong in 2019, which led to Chinese companies cancelling sponsorships and television arrangements. The Chinese Basketball Association, as well as Chinese sportswear labels like Li-Ning and the Club’s sponsoring China, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, all cut ties with the Houston Rockets, resulting in a significant financial loss. Thirdly, it is obvious that the United States of America would collaborate closely with these countries. Australia and Japan are treaty allies of the United States, while India is a key strategic partner. The existing bilateral security partnerships with Australia and Japan would also be impacted by a prospective military alliance. Both have US military bases and are listed as key non-NATO allies by the US. Australia is also a member of the ANZUS alliance, which includes the United States and New Zealand, as well as the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing agreement, which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Apart from security and economic agenda, other concerns among Americans include China’s human rights policy and environmental degradation.
What was Japan’s motive of joining?
For years, Japan claims to be bullied by China over territorial matters. Tensions over disputed islands in the East China Sea is one of them. China’s behaviour over these disputed islands, according to Japan’s defence minister, is jeopardising peace. Tokyo announced in January 2018 that it had discovered a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine near the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. It was the first time a Chinese submarine was seen in the Sensaku’s contiguous zone. Beijing also claims the uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.
What was India’s motive of joining?
China may pose a security threat to India as well. Without India’s consent, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through its territory. Under the Sino-Nepal friendship pact, China is expanding its rail and road networks to Tibet and Nepal, posing a security risk. China’s assertiveness over boundary disputes in Arunachal Pradesh’s Aksai Chin region is causing problems for India and the Indians who live in these disputed areas. Although many countries supported India’s membership into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the dragon nation has adamantly opposed it. In 2017, China and India experienced a 73-day military standoff over border tensions. China has also been assertive in its operations in the Indian Ocean, posing a security hazard to India. Besides using this alliance only to combat China, India also profits from mingling with other powerful countries that would give India exposure in the diplomatic world and provide an opportunity to finance certain projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
What was Australia’s motive of joining?
Despite the initial departure from the consortium to maintain the status-quo and trade relationships with China, Australia realized that the Indo-Pacific served its interests. Australia was already a part of close bilateral and trilateral relations with the United States and Japan and now had the opportunity to build the same with India by adding a fourth ‘C,’ Coal, to its existing ‘Commonwealth, Cricket, and Curry’ relationship. Furthermore, China’s interference and growing interest in Australia’s internal affairs, land, infrastructure, and politics has severely worried the country. In response to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s call for an international probe into the origins of Covid-19 in China, the communist government halted imports of Australian beef. Chinese officials have hinted that a student boycott of Australian colleges is possible. China’s ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, warned that by “teaming up with forces in Washington to launch a kind of political campaign against China,” Australia risks inflaming hostility among Chinese parents. The decision by China to impose an 80 per cent tariff on Australian barley exports could result in major losses for the industry. Last financial year, China purchased 2.5 million tonnes of barley from Australia, down from a peak of 5.9 million tonnes in 2016-17 but still significant. According to industrial analysts, China accounted for more than half of all Australian barley exports in 2018-19. Besides that, Beijing has vowed to limit tourist travel once the pandemic has subsided.
Moreover, in March 2020, US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun convened a teleconference with the Quad countries to discuss how they are responding to the COVID 19 pandemic. The presence of three additional Indo-Pacific states, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam made this telephonic meeting unusual. Each of the Quad countries’ three extra members are a valuable ally. They each have their own reasons for participating, the most common of which is to protect themselves from Chinese retaliation. This arrangement could also indicate a possible expansion of the Quad.
Quad seems to be more vital than ever to de-escalate the ever-increasing tensions arising from Chinese aggression. Over time, the Quad members have increased their cooperation and signed and announced several security and economic agreements. Given the growing cooperation among the Quad and Quad-Plus countries, the need to ensure freedom of navigation, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, energy preservation, regional capacity building, territorial connectivity, economic transparency, assistance to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, and the development of financially viable alternatives to Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy are of shared concerns.
Akanksha Tiwari
Intern, Asia in Global Affairs
REFERENCES:
- “QUAD: A Pragmatic Path Towards a Strategic Security Cooperation,” Centre for Studies in International Relations and Development, 18 July 2020 < https://csird.org.in/2020/07/18/quad-a-pragmatic-path-towards-a-strategic-security-co-operation-by-akansha-tiwari/>
- “The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2021 < https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know>
- “Why the Quad’s a big strategic Step forward for Australia,” Financial Review, 21 March 2021 < https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/why-the-quad-s-a-big-strategic-step-forward-for-australia-20210321-p57cl3>
- “View: American policy makers support the Quad, but does the public?,” The Economic Times, 30 August 2020 < https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-american-policy-makers-support-the-quad-but-does-the-public-/articleshow/77830675.cms?from=mdr>
“THE QUADRILATERAL UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: A HOLISTIC RECONSTRUCTION,” Asia in Global Affairs, 14 June 2021 < https://www.asiainglobalaffairs.in/dialogue/the-quadrilateral-under-the-biden-administration-a-holistic-reconstruction/>
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