On the TPSA and India’s Tibet Conundrum
Posted on : September 14, 2021Author : Debayan Ghatak
The TPSA (Tibetan Policy and Support Act), was passed with bipartisan support in the US Senate and on December 27th, 2020, it was signed into a law. Ever since its formal introduction, foreign policy circles have remained abuzz over the prospect of this novel piece of legislation, serving as a wake-up call for India to gain back its lost leverage vis-à-vis Tibet, in the backdrop of the still unresolved border imbroglio, as coupled with India’s unhindered emergence as the US’s all-weather ‘strategic partner’. The following is an account, delineating the ways in which, the Government of India and its associated policy makers can take ready recourse to the TPSA, in order to address the Chinese challenge of treating Tibet as its quintessential launch pad against India, alongside taking cognizance of the inherent challenges as axiomatic of such a proactive positioning.
Firstly, the TPSA lays stress upon the Chinese government to let the US open its consulate office in Tibet’s capital Lhasa, alongside making it obligatory on the part of the American leadership to open this consular outpost before the former allows any new Chinese consulate office/s to be set up in the US itself. Thus, the Government of India can pair up with the US, so as to advance its own pent-up demand of re-opening its consulate office in Lhasa, which witnessed a closure following the ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ of 1954. However, it must be remembered that all the clauses of the Panchsheel Agreement were trade related and had no connection with the principles of Panchsheel whatsoever. India, thereafter, had to surrender its three trade offices in Tibet, alongside its quintessential telephone/telegraph facilities, whilst ultimately foregoing its right to maintain an armed contingent in Tibet.
Secondly, the TPSA provides specific attention to the question of preserving the quintessential water resources and the overall environ of Tibet, which is one of the pivotal objectives to be secured by the Special Coordinator of the US for Tibet. It must be remembered that the environmental degradation in Tibet is mainly led by China’s extractive policies of mineral exploitation and hydroelectric power generation, while redirecting the course of the Tibetan rivers, having an adverse impact upon the Assam valley in particular. Thus, India while taking a much needed cue from the TPSA, must assert its rights, especially concerning the glaring issue of construction of dams and power houses on the Brahmaputra or Yarlung Tsangbo within Tibet. India could thus neutralize the potential of China using this ignominious ‘Water Bomb’ against itself, as witnessed at least twice in 2000 and once in 2005.
It can also join ranks with other associated riparian nations in this regard for instance Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and others, to mount up a joint resistance against China’s nefarious acts of disrupting river flow, alongside stealing water from the Tibetan rivers. India, it must be remembered, is the sole recipient of 48.83 percent of the total volume of river water leaving Chinese controlled territory and Chinese communist publications have teased India to assess- How this re-engineering of transboundary waters can potentially ‘choke’ the Indian economy in the ultimate extent?
Thirdly, it must be noted that the US laws in vogue constantly refer to Tibet as being an ‘occupied country’, which provides a ready blueprint for the Indian diplomatic and defence establishment, to make complementary and assertive amendments in its dealings with China. While harping upon its legal right and leveraging its moral positioning, India can remind the leaders in Beijing that while the latter tries to assert its forceful occupation of Indian land, it is basing these claims upon its illegitimate presence in a ‘Third Country’, that is Tibet. Thus, the Chinese have no right to make incoherent claims with regards to such issues, as had been previously resolved between the governments of Tibet and India. The Indian administration can even look at the prospect of appointing a special emissary for Tibet, by stating that although the latter has ceased to be a ‘political buffer’ for the two nations, it could well serve the purpose of being a ‘political bridge’ instead. It should also begin addressing the Himalayan frontier, by falling back upon the correct historical term that is the ‘Indo-Tibetan border’, to drive home its point.
It must be remembered in this instance that to tie India’s hands in this regard, China has been taking ready recourse to the 2003 agreement, by which India had formally recognized the cartographically truncated Tibet, which the Chinese refer to as the Tibet Autonomous Region, of being an inseparable part of the territory, as constitutive of the PRC. However, this inherent recognition in itself, allowed China to aggressively advance its ‘salami slicing’ strategy, whilst labelling Arunachal Pradesh as ‘South Tibet’, alongside increasing its advances into Indian-held ground. Now this agreement in itself has been nullified with China’s open violation of one of its key provisions that neither side in question would resort to the use or threat to use force against each other, thereby impeding the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas, pending the work as aimed towards the clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Fourthly, the TPSA directs the US government to work towards the rehabilitation of human rights, whilst preserving the distinct religious, cultural, linguistic and historical identity of the Tibetan populace. Thus, India must lend its wholehearted support to advance this objective of the American administration by raising its voice in support of the Tibetan people at appropriate international forums and in front of the international media. In this respect, it must be remembered that there are two pivotal and complementary issues on which India can pressurize China- The one concerning the self-immolation of over 150 Tibetans within Tibet, as observable over the past few years and the other being the manifestly unfortunate practice of the Nepalese administration, handing over the Tibetan refugees back to the Chinese authorities. Thus, this glaring issue has the potential to be raised at the UNHRC, alongside other international HR forums of much prominence, as aptly complimented with the support of the US itself.
Fifthly, the TPSA lays extensive attention on the question of forming an ‘international diplomatic coalition’ of likeminded nations, in order to mount a collective offensive against China. This aforementioned proposition, is also in sync with the immediate requirements of the Government of India, which must lay support to this endeavor of the US by proactively launching or joining such coalitions. This move is both politically necessary and morally expedient for India, since China has left no stones unturned to create a slew of problems and the concomitant embarrassment for India at various international platforms.
Finally, it must be taken note of that Mahayana Buddhism wields a very potent influence over the entire expanse of the 4000 kilometers long Himalayan belt, as extending from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, whilst encompassing Chinese occupied Tibet and the South Asian nations of India, Nepal and Bhutan. It is also a glaring fact that the present Dalai Lama is an honorary guest of India, alongside being the most respected as well as acceptable Buddhist spiritual leader of Indian communities spread all across the Himalayan belt. Thus, if China is able to install a puppet Dalia Lama, mimicking the manner which it has sabotaged the institution of the Panchet Lama, it can wreak havoc for India and its associated Himalayan neighbors.
Thus, the Government of India should lend strong support to the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) based in Dharamshala, alongside the US and other associated parties, to assert that the reincarnation of Dalai Lama alongside the other reincarnating Tibetan religious leaders or ‘Tulkus’, remains the exclusive preserve of the Tibetan people and the Dalai Lama himself. Such a call is reinforced by the Dalia Lama’s assertion that his reincarnate would appear in a ‘free’ country. The TPSA, it must be mentioned, also seeks to put sanctions on certain officials, who try to interfere in such a pivotal process. It must be remembered that on July 6th, 2021, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, reached out to the Dalai Lama on his 86th birthday, alongside Chief Minister Prema Khandu of Arunachal Pradesh and Prem Singh Tamang of Sikkim, which happens to be the first time since 2015 that the Indian leader has publicized his call to the Tibetan leader.
However, it must be remembered that this is not the sole instance of India using its troublesome ‘Tibet Card’, to score brownie points against Beijing. Modi had waved this card at the inaugural of his prime ministerial term in 2014, when Lobsang Sangay, who is the president of the CTA, was one of the special invitees at the said event and was even a part of a group photograph with the other South Asian heads of states. The subsequent months also witnessed the Dalai Lama meeting the then President Pranab Mukherjee at the Presidential Palace, who was also permitted to visit Tamang in the Arunachal Pradesh, where China claims more than 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory.
It was also at the height of the Doklam Crisis in 2017, which witnessed the Indian Army and the PLA locking horns in a 73-day standoff at the China-Bhutan-India trijunction that India permitted Sangay to unfurl the Tibetan flag at the quintessential Pangong Tso, which is situated in the western sector of the disputed Sino-Indian border. However, in an effort to look tough in the eyes of his nationalist supporters and hoping that China would act more sensitively on issues of concern to India, the aforementioned moves ended up raising Beijing’s ire, with India shelving the Tibet card in early 2018. Thus, the Indian foreign ministry issued a directive to government officials to stay away from CTA events and the Tibetans were specifically asked to keep the events marking the 60th anniversary of their flight to India low key.
The present context to deploy the Tibet card yet again has been precipitated by the Galwan Valley clash of June 14th, 2020, the months since witnessing the stepped up deployment of military personnel and hardware along the entire stretch of the LAC, with the military officials having engaged in 12 rounds of talks till date. The government also announced the deployment of the Special Frontier Force, which is an elite commando unit having been raised from among the members of the Tibetan exile community, which India used in its covert operations behind Chinese lines at a key offensive against the PLA at Pangong Tso. It must also be remembered that the funeral of an SFT company leader also garnered a lot of publicity in the media.
However, going by the experience of 2014-18 India must remember that the Tibet question remains a ‘core issue’ for China and various Chinese commentators have warned that any tickling on the part of India can result in a retaliation in India’s Northeast, which is a conflict ridden zone and any kind of support which the Chinese may provide to the anti-India insurgents, can break asunder the relative stability of this locale. Thus, India would do well to constantly keep count of the eggs in its own basket, whilst entering into an adaptive yet coherent policy stance towards Tibet, which bequeaths of a much-needed geopolitical reckoning.
References
- Brahma Chellaney, “Wake-up call on Tibet: America’s Tibet law should spur New Delhi to reclaim lost leverage on China,” The Times of India, January 23, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/wake-up-call-on-tibet-americas-tibet-law-should-spur-new-delhi-to-reclaim-lost-leverage-on-china/
- Sudha Ramachandran, “Prime Minister Modi Plays the ‘Tibet Card’ Again: This may impress his fans at home. But will it frighten the Chinese?,” The Diplomat, July 13, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/prime-minister-modi-plays-the-tibet-card-again/
Debayan Ghatak
Intern, Asia in Global Affairs
(The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the author.)
Leave a Reply