Augmenting India’s Defence Framework through the creation of Joint Theatre Commands

The process of creation of Joint Theatre Commands (JTCs) has gathered significant impetus after the appointment of Gen. Bipin Rawat, as India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) on 1st January, 2020, alongside the creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) itself. This move has been described to be a ‘deliberate’, ‘thoughtful’ and ‘well-considered initiative’ by the Army Chief General M. M. Naravane himself. The GoI (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 expressly mentions that one of the quintessential functions of the new DMA, would be to facilitate the essential restructuring of Military Commands, so as to augment the optimal utilization of resources, by bringing in a semblance of ‘jointness’ in conducting pivotal operations, through the very establishment of Joint/Theatre Commands. The idea, however, is not a novel one, with 32 countries in the world at large, already boasting of a Joint Services setup, with the essential inclusion of key military powers like the United States and China. 

Ever since the Kargil War in 1999, successive committees of the Government ranging from the Kargil Review Committee to the Group of Ministers to the Naresh Chandra Committee, have all called for an efficient structural management at the higher defence level. As an outcome of such constructive suggestions, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was established at the bureaucratic level, alongside the creation of two Joint Commands namely the Andaman and Nicobar Command (A&NC) and the Strategic Forces Command. Thereby we can witness that India’s firm resolve at the creation of integrated theatre commands seems to be quite clear and decisive, but if we take a look at the onerous list of ambitious undertakings, which has been in the pipeline with regards to defense-related reforms, this novel and proactive initiative, despite being a very timely move in the right direction, has essentially left unaddressed the multilayered challenges that comes in the way of policy aspiration and implementation.

Thereby it is incumbent to take a holistic look at the range of challenges facing the CDC in particular and the Indian defence establishment in general, which are listed as under. Firstly, the very structure of the command is in question because of an essential dilemma as to who will report to whom within the tri-services and the JTC matrix, alongside the question as to whether the army chiefs or theatre commanders will possess an essential operational command over the personnel and machinery. Secondly, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is reeling under an acute resource crunch, as being currently operational at 31 squadrons despite possessing a sanctioned strength of 42, which would make it immensely difficult to concentrate air assets in a particular command having a definite territorial ambit. Thirdly, the much vaunted inter-services zeal as operative within the armed forces, where each arm aims to strive for the overall management of its own assets, while zealously augmenting a yet greater share in terms of budgetary allocation, may create a lack of synergy in the ultimate extent. Fourthly, India in general, possesses a minimal experience of operating these integrated command structures and would need ‘mid-course corrections’ as harped upon by the Army Chief as well to expeditiously identify loopholes, alongside suggesting effective remedies, which can slowdown the integration process even further. Fifthly, there is also an essential debate concerning the number of Maritime Commands to be put in place, as to whether it should be one or two.

However, despite facing such glaring obstacles, the Indian military establishment is making progress at a rapid pace to fulfill this cherished aim. The military is reported to be effectively reorganized into five theatre commands by 2022 namely the Northern Command, which would oversee the border along with China, the Western Command, which would look after the border with Pakistan, the Peninsular Command, the Air Defence Command and lastly, the Maritime Command. These would be headed by commanders having the position of a Lieutenant General and their equivalent ranks, alongside the service Chiefs, who would essentially oversee the mobilization of resources to the respective theatre commanders. In an effort so as not to split the valuable assets at the IAF’s disposal, they would be pooled in and placed under the Air Defence Command, whose task would be to secure the Indian airspace in general. 

It is in this context that two dimensions concerning this ambitious undertaking need to be explicitly mentioned, the one being economic while the other strategic. 

With regards to the economic scenario, we can see that 28 percent of the Ministry of Defence’s 2020-21’s budget was allocated towards pensions, while another 40 percent was being directed to meet payment salaries and allowances. Despite India being the 4th largest spender on military, the percentage of GDP allocated to defence has consistently shrunk and currently stands at a meagre 1.8 percent, the lowest since the culmination of the 1962 Border War. Thereby we can observe that the move to reduce redundancy across the tri-services, alongside the essential integration of manpower within the respective theatre commands, has the inherent potential to redirect a significant proportion of the allocation towards the maintenance and modernization of military equipment, alongside augmenting capabilities. The same strategy is clearly observable in the proposal with regards to the integration of medical services, hospitals and training facilities. Many commentators are of the concerned opinion that this essential reduction of expenditure has the capacity to shield the armed forces from a reduction in the defence budget under the economic uncertainty brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, without adversely impacting the effectiveness of the armed forces in general, as can be witnessed through such proposals as the creation of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) in this instance.

Another benefit that may accrue on the economic front is the integrated approach towards procurement, which would help to streamline the requirements of the military as a whole. Such an orientation, besides leading to an essential synergy between the tri-services, would also bring in a measure of systematic planning concerning the acquisition of critical resources, which would finally bring to an end the perennial problem of piecemeal procurement at the behest of individual services on an emergency basis, leading to higher costs thereby leading to a significant reduction in terms of maintenance and management of assets. Many defence analysts have pointed out that the way this could be done is through the procurement of similar vehicles, which would ease off maintenance and spares management, alongside jointly contracting out specialized assets for the benefit of the tri-services. Amidst such a mood, the process of giving out bulk orders, which would preferably be directed to the domestic defence market under the auspices of the Make in India initiative, would serve the twin advantage of the military getting a better rate for its essential purchases, alongside augmenting the rise and expansion of the domestic sector, in the process allowing the latter to pump in more investments that would lead to the enhancement of production quality with a certain degree of confidence.

It is in this connection that there is much impetus regarding the integration of logistics through the formation of a Joint Logistics Command, which is yet another avenue to reduce expenditure alongside the efficient augmentation of existent resources. According to the CDC, this command would specifically look after the aspects of common contract management for the three services, with the added objective of maintaining common inventories for maintaining reserves as well. There is an acute indication that the conflict with China unravelling in Ladakh, would become yet more pronounced and prolonged with the passing of time and the effective movement of forces, machinery and rations is set to become quite an uphill task, whilst navigating the contours of a mountainous locale compounded with the harshness of the Himalayan winter. Alongside such a consideration, the process of jointly catering to the Army and Air Force, both of which remains stationed in the northern union territory, would essentially bring in a semblance of monetary savings alongside augmenting inter-services cooperation and coordination.

In this instance, it is important to take note of the fact that China has quite worryingly undertaken a reorganization of its forces, which were previously under two separate commands  into a mammoth Western Command, which has the full responsibility for looking after the border with India. In the absence of an effective theatre command, eight separate operational commands of India would essentially come into the picture, involving three Army Commands and Air Force Commands each. In case of a naval escalation we can also witness the inclusion of the Navy’s Eastern Command and the sole tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Theatre Command. It must be mentioned here that it was the wave of reforms undertaken by the Chinese PLA, aimed at meeting the exigency of an increasing payroll while saving up crucial budgetary resources for modernization, which served as an essential wake-up call for India in this regard.

When adjudged from the strategic angle, there is also an impending requirement to realize the fact that alongside the creation of JTCs, there is a glaring need to take stock of the very changing nature of warfare itself, which is in full display with the introduction of drones and unmanned aerial systems to the emergent dimensions of cyber, electronic, psychological and space warfare, harping upon the need to augment next generation weaponry and artificial intelligence, whilst ultimately aiding the creation of several ‘disruptive technologies’. In this instance, India would augur well to take a closer look at China, which has established a Strategic Support Service, which is essentially constituted of three independent forces namely cyber force, space force and electronic warfare. 

In conclusion, we can say that despite several operational and conceptual hurdles towards the implementation of the JTC scheme, the main aim behind the former’s implementation is to secure the way in which the three arms of the Indian military establishment operate with each other, not as individual actors but as the ‘armed forces of the nation’. There is a palpable fear that the proposed plan would help in the perpetuation of the army’s dominance in the armed forces, whilst vesting it with greater operational control. This fear is there because of the fact that the army has been the most visible among the three services, with its officers finding more representation in important multilateral leadership positions. However, under the proposed integrated commands structure, the IAF would inherently be at the helm of affairs concerning the Air Defence Command, because of its inherent expertise and direct responsibility in this instance. Bureaucracy should also be kept at a minimum, so as to garner an efficient command and control configuration. Thus, a ‘deliberate’, ‘thoughtful’ and ‘well-considered initiative’ so as to augment these reforms is the need of the hour in the words of the Army Chief, with the JTC being an idea whose time to shine is finally here. 

References

• Shauryavardhan Sharma, “Theatre Commands: Prospects and Challenges”, Observer Research Foundation, February 3, 2021, https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/theater-commands-prospects-and-challenges/

• Harsh V. Pant and Javin Aryan, “The biggest challenge before India’s joint theatre commands plan – who will report to whom”, ThePrint, October 30, 2020, https://www.google.com/amp/s/theprint.in/opinion/the-biggest-challenge-before-indias-joint-theatre-commands-plan-who-will-report-to-whom/533357/%3famp

Debayan Ghatak, 

Intern, Asia in Global Affairs