Quad as a non-military option for India

The meeting between defence chiefs of the USA, Australia, Japan and the Philippines in Hawaii on May 2, 2024 was a significant event signalling a growing militarized Indo-Pacific strategy led by USA in the context of China’s increasingly assertive posture against Manila over South China Sea dispute. The countries’ resolution to strengthen multilateral defence cooperation to counter Chinese assertiveness points to counter-assertive stance. Noteworthy, this new minilateral grouping (nicknamed ‘Squad’), if juxtaposed with Quad (another minilateral grouping comprised of USA, Japan, Australia and India), looks more unambiguous about taking on China. India’s reservation to turn Quad into a military alliance has been an obstacle in this respect. Therefore, it is opined that ‘Squad’ is the result of US’ ‘anger’ against India over Quad. However, Quad, even if apathetic for a military alliance like NATO, can boost India’s ‘counter China’ strategy.
Quad: turning insipid as defence alliance
Alliance is a traditional practice in inter-state relations meant for countering the adversary. It is a central phenomenon of world politics. Normally alliance is perceived to be an agreement to address national security issue of the partner countries covering the question of assistance in case of attack on their sovereignty. Thus, military alliance has been the most common of all inter-state alliances in history. However, Quad can be considered as an exception in this context since the alliance evades the question of assistance if/when partners’ sovereignty comes under attack. Besides, the revival of the traditional defence alliance among the US partners in the Pacific-Japan, Australia, the Philippines along with USA to counter China underlines the fact that Quad somehow is turning insipid to the USA. USA wants a zero-sum approach to Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific which Quad cannot afford to do due to India’s reservation. The reservation is not only due to India’s consistent favour for strategic autonomy and her distaste for any formal defence/military alliance, but logical considerations as well.
From India’s perspective, Quad emerging as a combative defence initiative will possibly be naval alliance with its declared focus on Indo-Pacific maritime region, especially in the Pacific, where the major flashpoints-Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and South China Sea-lie. India, with weak naval strength currently and a primarily land-oriented defence strategy against China and Pakistan, will be of little help for combative Quad mission. Besides, India might hesitate to nudge China over her Pacific challenges in Taiwan and South China Sea to thwart aggressive Chinese counter moves in South Asia. A militarised Quad might require India to be active in the Pacific region with flashpoints like Taiwan and South China Sea, which might be a pressure on India’s current naval strength. Besides, India’s security priority lies in the Indian Ocean region, between the African coast and Malacca Straits while the Pacific region comes second. The ongoing Hamas-Israel conflict in West Asia is spilling over in the Red Sea and adjoining maritime zone hurting the commercial maritime traffic in the region affecting India’s energy and economic interests. The Indian Navy is active in the region to ensure safety to the ships passing through the maritime zone from both the Houthi attacks as well as Somali pirates. Thus India, having more challenges to handle in the Indian Ocean region, cannot afford to be active in the Pacific simultaneously.
Still Quad is an option
However, Quad, if not viewed through military prism, can be beneficial for India.
Firstly, Quad brings a super power and its allies closer to India paving the way for further defence partnership promoting interoperability boosting Indian naval strength. Interestingly, Quad under US leadership is attracting other traditional US allies to join in conducting naval drill. This expands the scope for informal defence alliance helping India without directly targeting China.
Secondly, Quad can be a platform for technological cooperation. USA, Japan and India have traditionally invested in information and technology (IT) and India has gained reputation in the IT sector. Technological cooperation among the Quad can be helpful in countering growing Chinese clout in this sphere through 5G of Huawei and cyber attacks. On the other hand such technological cooperation can be useful for US-led Five Eyes intelligence sharing alliance of which Australia is a partner. Technological cooperation can pave India’s entry in the group in future. There is already a growing demand in USA to include India and Japan (also South Korea) in this intelligence sharing platform.
Thirdly, India can benefit from the Quad Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI). Decided among India, Japan and Australia in 2021, this mission means to ‘avoid supply chain disruptions’ (implying overdependence on Chinese markets for finished goods and supplies). Japan and Australia have been victims of occasional Chinese economic blackmailing following any dispute while India wants to diversify sources to avoid similar situation. India virtually joined the SCRI meeting with Australia and Japan in April 2021 where plans were chalked out to implement the initiative.
Fourthly, the coming together of the strategic rivals, when do not directly target China and thus give no scope to the dragon to roar, can, as seem to have already, upset Beijing. The scurrilous warning of the Chinese ambassador to Dhaka against Bangladesh joining Quad and even calling Quad an ‘Indo-Pacific NATO’ reflect the nervousness of China concerning Quad. This nervousness is a strategic advantage for India since Quad serves India’s interest keeping China under pressure.
Conclusion
Back in 1960s, India’s the then Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai had proposed cooperation between India, Japan and Australia to contain China. Today Prime Minister Narendra Modi is proposing JAI (Japan, America and India) partnership underlining the ‘democratic values’ of the partner countries (as against authoritarian China). However, India’s traditional apathy for any formal military alliance has directed her course of action for non-military/non-aggressive alternatives to take on the rival. Quad caters to India a chance in this respect and has potentials to advance Indian interests to counter China in non-aggressive manner.

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Subhadeep Bhattacharya
Adjunct researcher at Asia in Global Affairs

The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the author, in his personal capacity. It does not reflect the policies and perspectives of Asia in Global Affairs.